Windows

Detection rules for Windows data sources. Each rule includes its MITRE ATT&CK mapping, impact rating, and a description of what it detects. These rules analyze events with the data type wineventlog, which the Windows Agent integration sends.

This category contains 56 detection rules.

RuleCategoryTechniqueImpact (C/I/A)
ADFS Authentication AnomaliesDefense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial AccessT1078 - Valid AccountsC:3 / I:2 / A:2
AS-REP Roasting Attack DetectionCredential AccessT1558.004 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: AS-REP RoastingC:3 / I:2 / A:1
AdminSDHolder Abuse DetectionPersistence, Privilege EscalationT1098 - Account ManipulationC:3 / I:3 / A:2
Certificate Services Abuse DetectionCredential AccessT1558 - Steal or Forge Kerberos TicketsC:3 / I:3 / A:1
Golden Ticket Attack DetectionCredential AccessT1558.001 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden TicketC:3 / I:3 / A:3
Kerberoasting Attack DetectionCredential AccessT1558.003 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: KerberoastingC:3 / I:2 / A:1
NTDS.dit Extraction AttemptCredential AccessT1003.003 - OS Credential Dumping: NTDSC:3 / I:3 / A:1
NTLM Authentication Downgrade AttackDefense EvasionT1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify ToolsC:3 / I:3 / A:1
Process Masquerading DetectionDefense EvasionT1036.005 - Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or LocationC:2 / I:3 / A:2
SAM Database Access AttemptCredential AccessT1003.002 - OS Credential Dumping: Security Account ManagerC:3 / I:3 / A:1
SID History Injection AttemptDefense Evasion, Privilege EscalationT1134.005 - Access Token Manipulation: SID-History InjectionC:3 / I:3 / A:1
SMBv1 Usage DetectionLateral MovementT1210 - Exploitation of Remote ServicesC:3 / I:2 / A:2
Silver Ticket Attack DetectionCredential AccessT1558.002 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Silver TicketC:3 / I:3 / A:2
Windows Remote Management (WinRM) AbuseLateral MovementT1021.006 - Remote Services: Windows Remote ManagementC:3 / I:3 / A:2
Windows audit log was clearedDefense EvasionT1070.001 - Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event LogsC:1 / I:2 / A:3
Windows: Account Added to a Privileged GroupAdministrative AwarenessPrivileged group membership changeC:2 / I:2 / A:0
Windows: Audit Policy Changed by a User AccountAdministrative AwarenessAudit policy changeC:1 / I:2 / A:0
Windows: Audit Policy or Event Log TamperingDefense EvasionT1562.002 - Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event LoggingC:2 / I:3 / A:2
Windows: Built-in Administrator or Guest Account EnabledAdministrative AwarenessBuilt-in account enabledC:2 / I:2 / A:0
Windows: Credential Dumping Tool IndicatorsCredential AccessT1003 - OS Credential DumpingC:3 / I:3 / A:2
Windows: Directory Services Restore Mode Password SetAdministrative AwarenessDomain controller recovery password changeC:2 / I:2 / A:0
Windows: Domain Trust Created, Removed or ChangedAdministrative AwarenessDomain trust changeC:2 / I:2 / A:1
Windows: Firewall Rule or Configuration DeletedDefense EvasionT1562.004 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System FirewallC:1 / I:3 / A:2
Windows: GetSystem-Style Service Installed for SYSTEM Token ImpersonationPrivilege EscalationT1134.001 - Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/TheftC:3 / I:3 / A:1
Windows: Group Policy Object ChangedAdministrative AwarenessGroup Policy changeC:1 / I:1 / A:0
Windows: LOLBin Proxy Execution / Ingress Tool TransferDefense EvasionT1218 - System Binary Proxy ExecutionC:2 / I:2 / A:1
Windows: LSA Secrets or DPAPI Backup Key AccessCredential AccessT1003.004 - OS Credential Dumping: LSA SecretsC:3 / I:1 / A:1
Windows: LSASS Memory Dump Handle AccessCredential AccessT1003.001 - OS Credential Dumping: LSASS MemoryC:2 / I:3 / A:3
Windows: Microsoft Defender Antivirus Protection DisabledAdministrative AwarenessAntivirus protection disabledC:1 / I:2 / A:0
Windows: Multiple Logon Failure Followed by Logon SuccessCredential AccessT1110 - Brute ForceC:2 / I:2 / A:3
Windows: New User Account CreatedAdministrative AwarenessUser account creationC:1 / I:1 / A:0
Windows: New Windows Service Created to start from windows root path. Suspicious event as the binary may have been dropped using Windows Admin SharesExecutionT1021.002 - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin SharesC:1 / I:2 / A:3
Windows: Office Application Spawned Command or Script InterpreterExecutionT1204.002 - User Execution: Malicious FileC:2 / I:3 / A:2
Windows: Pass the Hash ActivityLateral MovementT1550.002 - Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the HashC:3 / I:2 / A:1
Windows: Password, Lockout or Kerberos Policy ChangedAdministrative AwarenessAccount policy changeC:1 / I:1 / A:0
Windows: Persistence via PowerShell profilePersistenceT1546.013 - Event Triggered Execution: PowerShell ProfileC:2 / I:3 / A:1
Windows: Possible Brute Force AttackCredential AccessT1110 - Brute ForceC:2 / I:2 / A:3
Windows: Possible ransomware attack detected. Multiple File Deletion.ImpactT1486 - Data Encrypted for ImpactC:1 / I:3 / A:2
Windows: Possible ransomware attack detected. Ransomware Note Creation.ImpactT1486 - Data Encrypted for ImpactC:3 / I:3 / A:2
Windows: Possible ransomware attack detected. Unusual File Extensions.ImpactT1486 - Data Encrypted for ImpactC:3 / I:3 / A:3
Windows: Printer driver failed to load, possible remote code execution using PrinterNightmare exploit: CVE-2021-34527Lateral MovementT1210 - Exploitation of Remote ServicesC:3 / I:2 / A:1
Windows: Ransomware Recovery Inhibition (Shadow Copy / Backup Deletion)ImpactT1490 - Inhibit System RecoveryC:1 / I:3 / A:3
Windows: Remote File Download via Desktopimgdownldr UtilityCommand and ControlT1105 - Ingress Tool TransferC:2 / I:3 / A:1
Windows: Scheduled Task Created with Suspicious ActionPersistenceT1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskC:2 / I:3 / A:1
Windows: Suspicious PowerShell (Encoded / Download Cradle / AMSI Bypass)ExecutionT1059.001 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShellC:2 / I:3 / A:2
Windows: Suspicious Print Spooler SPL File CreatedPrivilege EscalationT1068 - Exploitation for Privilege EscalationC:1 / I:3 / A:2
Windows: Suspicious PrintSpooler Service Executable File CreationPrivilege EscalationT1068 - Exploitation for Privilege EscalationC:2 / I:3 / A:1
Windows: Suspicious Scheduled Task CreatedPersistenceT1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskC:2 / I:2 / A:1
Windows: Suspicious Service InstallationExecutionT1569.002 - System Services: Service ExecutionC:2 / I:3 / A:2
Windows: SysKey Registry Subkey AccessDiscoveryT1012 - Query RegistryC:3 / I:1 / A:1
Windows: UAC Bypass Attempt via Privileged IFileOperation COM InterfacePrivilege EscalationT1548.002 - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account ControlC:1 / I:3 / A:2
Windows: Unauthorized RMM Tool Service InstallationCommand and ControlT1219.002 - Remote Access Software: Remote Desktop SoftwareC:2 / I:2 / A:1
Windows: Unusual File Modification by dns.exeLateral MovementT1210 - Exploitation of Remote ServicesC:1 / I:3 / A:2
Windows: Unusual Process Network ConnectionDefense EvasionTrusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionC:3 / I:3 / A:2
Windows: User logged using Remote Desktop Connection from loopback address, possible exploit over reverse tunneling using stolen credentialsCredential AccessT1021.001 - Remote Services: Remote Desktop ProtocolC:3 / I:2 / A:1
Windows: Windows Firewall Turned OffAdministrative AwarenessHost firewall disabledC:1 / I:2 / A:0

Rule Example

Below is an example of a rule definition for ADFS Authentication Anomalies (view in repository):

# Rule version v1.0.1

dataTypes:
  - wineventlog
name: ADFS Authentication Anomalies
impact:
  confidentiality: 3
  integrity: 2
  availability: 2
category: Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access
technique: "T1078 - Valid Accounts"
adversary: origin
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/troubleshooting/ad-fs-tshoot-logging
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
description: |
  Detects anomalous authentication attempts against Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) including multiple failed attempts that could indicate password spraying or brute force attacks. This rule monitors for authentication failures, token validation failures, and other ADFS security events that may indicate malicious activity.

  Next Steps:
  1. Review the source IP address and determine if it's from a known/trusted location
  2. Check for patterns of failed authentication attempts across multiple users
  3. Examine ADFS audit logs for additional context around the authentication failures
  4. Verify if the targeted user accounts are valid and active
  5. Consider implementing IP-based blocking if malicious activity is confirmed
  6. Review ADFS configuration for security hardening opportunities
  7. Correlate with other authentication events across the domain
where: |
  !oneOf("dataSource", ["", "unknown"]) &&
  exists("log.authenticationSource") &&
  equals("log.providerName", "AD FS") && (equals("log.eventCode", "342") || equals("log.eventCode", "516")) && contains("log.message", "token validation failed")
afterEvents:
  - with:
      - field: dataSource
        operator: filter_term
        value: '{{.dataSource}}'
      - field: log.authenticationSource
        operator: filter_term
        value: '{{.log.authenticationSource}}'
      - field: log.authenticationCandidate.adfsAuthenticationAnomalies
        operator: filter_term
        value: match
      - field: log.eventCode
        operator: filter_term
        value: '{{.log.eventCode}}'
    within: 10m
    count: 10
groupBy:
  - dataSource
  - lastEvent.log.authenticationSource
  - target.user

Rule Details

ADFS Authentication Anomalies

Detects anomalous authentication attempts against Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) including multiple failed attempts that could indicate password spraying or brute force attacks. This rule monitors for authentication failures, token validation failures, and other ADFS security events that may indicate malicious activity.

AS-REP Roasting Attack Detection

Detects AS-REP Roasting attacks targeting accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled.
Attackers request AS-REP messages encrypted with RC4 (0x17) for accounts that do not require
pre-authentication, enabling offline password cracking. This is a companion technique to Kerberoasting
and targets a different set of vulnerable accounts.

AdminSDHolder Abuse Detection

Detects modifications to the AdminSDHolder object which can be used for persistence by granting elevated privileges. The SDProp process propagates these permissions to protected groups every 60 minutes, making this a critical security event. It reads directory service change events (5136), whose ObjectDN field names the changed object; access events (4662) name objects by GUID and cannot identify AdminSDHolder. Changes made by SYSTEM (S-1-5-18) are excluded. One alert is raised per domain controller and account; repeats are suppressed for seven days.

Certificate Services Abuse Detection

Detects suspicious certificate requests and issuance that could indicate Golden Certificate attacks or unauthorized certificate generation for persistence. This rule monitors Windows Certificate Services events for potentially malicious certificate operations, particularly those involving machine accounts or anonymous logons that could be leveraged for persistence and privilege escalation. The requesting account is read from the Requester field of events 4886 and 4887. One alert is raised per computer and requester; repeats are suppressed for seven days.

Golden Ticket Attack Detection

Detects Golden Ticket attacks where adversaries forge Kerberos TGTs using the KRBTGT account
hash, granting unlimited domain access. The rule detects anomalous TGT usage patterns including
TGS requests with unusual encryption types, tickets with abnormally long lifetimes, and Kerberos
authentication from non-domain-controller sources for the KRBTGT service.

Kerberoasting Attack Detection

Detects Kerberoasting attacks where adversaries request Kerberos TGS tickets encrypted with RC4 (0x17) for
service accounts in order to crack them offline and obtain plaintext credentials. This is the most common
Active Directory credential theft technique used in real-world compromises. The rule monitors Event ID 4769
(Kerberos Service Ticket Operations) for RC4 encryption requests while excluding machine accounts (ending in $)
and legitimate system services.

NTDS.dit Extraction Attempt

Detects attempts to access or copy the Active Directory domain database (NTDS.dit) which contains password hashes for all domain users. This is a critical indicator of credential theft attempts and potential domain compromise.

NTLM Authentication Downgrade Attack

Detects NTLM authentication downgrade attacks via registry modifications to LMCompatibilityLevel,
NtlmMinClientSec, and NtlmMinServerSec. Attackers modify these registry values to weaken NTLM
authentication security, enabling credential interception, relay attacks, and offline cracking
of captured NTLM hashes. Downgrading to LM or NTLMv1 authentication makes credential theft
significantly easier.

Process Masquerading Detection

Detects executables masquerading as legitimate Windows system processes but running from
incorrect locations. For example, svchost.exe should only run from C:\Windows\System32,
and explorer.exe should only run from C:\Windows. Malware commonly uses legitimate process
names to avoid detection by analysts and automated tools.

SAM Database Access Attempt

Detects attempts to access the Security Account Manager (SAM) database, which contains local user account hashes. This activity may indicate credential dumping attempts by attackers trying to extract password hashes for offline cracking or lateral movement. One alert is raised per computer and account; repeats are suppressed for seven days.

SID History Injection Attempt

Detects attempts to add SID History to an account, which can be used for privilege escalation. SID History injection allows attackers to inherit permissions from privileged accounts without being members of privileged groups. Both successful (4765) and failed (4766) attempts are monitored.

SMBv1 Usage Detection

Detects usage of the deprecated and vulnerable SMBv1 protocol which could be exploited for lateral movement or ransomware propagation. SMBv1 is susceptible to numerous security vulnerabilities including EternalBlue and should be disabled in favor of SMBv2/SMBv3. Once SMBv1 access auditing is enabled (Set-SmbServerConfiguration -AuditSmb1Access $true), Windows writes event 3000 to the Microsoft-Windows-SMBServer/Audit log each time a client uses SMBv1, so the event itself is the signal. One alert is raised per server; repeats are suppressed for seven days.

Silver Ticket Attack Detection

Detects Silver Ticket attacks where adversaries forge Kerberos TGS tickets using a service
account's NTLM hash, bypassing the KDC entirely. Unlike Golden Tickets, Silver Tickets target
specific services. The rule detects TGS tickets presented without corresponding TGT requests,
and service access events with anomalous Kerberos authentication patterns.

Windows Remote Management (WinRM) Abuse

Detects potential abuse of Windows Remote Management (WinRM) for lateral movement: a shell or a discovery or administration tool started (4688) by the WinRM host processes (wsmprovhost.exe or winrshost.exe), indicating remote command execution via WinRM.

Windows audit log was cleared

Detects when the Windows audit log (Security event log) has been cleared. Adversaries may clear event logs to remove evidence of an intrusion.

Windows: Account Added to a Privileged Group

A user, computer or group was added to a Windows group that grants administrative control (events 4728, 4732 and 4756): the local or domain Administrators group, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, Account Operators, Server Operators, Backup Operators, Print Operators, Replicator, Domain Controllers, Read-only Domain Controllers, Key Admins or Enterprise Key Admins. Groups are recognized by their fixed security identifier, so renamed or translated group names still match. This is an awareness alert for an administrative change; on its own it does not mean the system is compromised.

Additions made by the same account to the same group on the same computer are grouped under one alert. Windows LAPS automatic account management adds its managed account to the local Administrators group at every rotation, so a computer using it produces one alert and later rotations appear as child alerts.

Requires the "Audit Security Group Management" success audit on domain controllers and on computers whose local groups are monitored.

Windows: Audit Policy Changed by a User Account

An account signed in as a user changed the computer's audit policy (event 4719), for example with auditpol.exe or the local security policy editor. The audit policy decides which security events Windows records, so switching categories off hides later activity. Microsoft recommends investigating any change that was not planned. Windows always records this event.

Changes made by the system itself are left out: SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE and computer accounts. Windows reapplies the audit policy from Group Policy under those accounts many times a day, so audit changes delivered through Group Policy are not reported here. Changes by the same account on the same computer are grouped under one alert.

Windows: Audit Policy or Event Log Tampering

Detects clearing of event logs (event 104) or command-line tampering with auditing/logging (auditpol /clear or /set ...disable, wevtutil cl, Clear-EventLog, fsutil usn deletejournal). Complements the Security-log-cleared (1102) rule.

Windows: Built-in Administrator or Guest Account Enabled

The built-in Administrator account or the built-in Guest account was enabled on a computer or in a domain (event 4722). Every computer and every domain has these two accounts, with fixed identifiers ending in 500 and 501, which makes them well-known targets. Microsoft's Windows LAPS guidance recommends leaving the built-in Administrator account unused and disabled. The account is recognized by its identifier, so renamed or translated account names still match.

Enabling the same account again by the same account on the same computer is grouped under one alert.

Requires the "Audit User Account Management" success audit.

Windows: Credential Dumping Tool Indicators

Detects command-line and PowerShell script-block indicators of credential-dumping tools (mimikatz/sekurlsa/lsadump, procdump lsass, comsvcs MiniDump, nanodump, rubeus). The command-line branch is the reliable trigger since AMSI blocks literal mimikatz strings in PowerShell.

Windows: Directory Services Restore Mode Password Set

A domain controller recorded an attempt to set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password (event 4794). This local administrator account is used to start a domain controller in repair mode. Microsoft recommends alerting on every occurrence. The event covers successful and failed attempts; check the status in the event.

Windows LAPS can manage this password on domain controllers. Its scheduled changes run as SYSTEM and, like other repeated changes by the same account on the same domain controller, are grouped under one alert.

Requires the "Audit User Account Management" success and failure audit on domain controllers.

Windows: Domain Trust Created, Removed or Changed

A domain controller recorded that a trust to another domain was created (event 4706), removed (event 4707) or changed (event 4716). Trusts decide which accounts from other domains can reach resources in this domain. Microsoft recommends alerting on every trust change.

Automatic trust password resets are left out: Microsoft documents that a 4716 event whose actor is ANONYMOUS LOGON (S-1-5-7) is the system's scheduled trust password reset. Changes by the same account on the same domain controller are grouped under one alert.

Requires the "Audit Authentication Policy Change" success audit on domain controllers.

Windows: Firewall Rule or Configuration Deleted

A rule (or all rules) was deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall
exception list by a process other than the OS's own firewall service or
Defender -- a common step before staging a listener or exfiltration
channel that the default firewall policy would otherwise block.

Windows: GetSystem-Style Service Installed for SYSTEM Token Impersonation

A service was installed whose binary path matches one of the known
Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike "getsystem" techniques: a named-pipe
echo/impersonation trick run through cmd.exe, a rundll32 DLL-based
technique, or a service pointed at the local ADMIN$ share
(\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\). All three are used to spawn a SYSTEM-level
process via a short-lived service and then impersonate its token --
none of them resemble a legitimate installer's ImagePath.

Windows: Group Policy Object Changed

A domain controller recorded a change to a Group Policy object in Active Directory (event 5136 on an object of class groupPolicyContainer): a new policy, a renamed policy, a permission change or a settings update. A Group Policy change reaches every computer and user the policy applies to.

Active Directory records each attribute update as a removal of the old value followed by the addition of the new one. Following Microsoft's advice, the rule uses only the "value added" record (%%14674). Changes by the same account to the same policy on the same domain controller are grouped under one alert. Deleted policies are not covered, because the Windows filter discards the deletion event (5141).

Requires the "Audit Directory Service Changes" success audit on domain controllers and an auditing entry that covers Group Policy objects.

Windows: LOLBin Proxy Execution / Ingress Tool Transfer

Detects living-off-the-land binaries used for proxy execution or download (mshta http, regsvr32 squiblydoo, certutil -urlcache/-decode, bitsadmin /transfer, wmic process call create, msbuild, installutil, mavinject).

Windows: LSA Secrets or DPAPI Backup Key Access

A handle was opened to a registry SecretObject with write-DAC/read access,
including the domain's DPAPI backup key (BCKUPKEY) -- the object class
tools like Mimikatz's lsadump::secrets and lsadump::backupkeys query to
recover service account passwords, cached credentials and DPAPI master
keys. This object is never touched during normal administration.

Windows: LSASS Memory Dump Handle Access

Identifies handle requests for the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) object access with specific access masks that many tools with a capability to dump memory to disk use (0x1fffff, 0x1010, 0x120089). This rule is tool agnostic as it has been validated against a host of various LSASS dump tools such as SharpDump, Procdump, Mimikatz, Comsvcs etc. It detects this behavior at a low level and does not depend on a specific tool or dump file name. Programs under Program Files, Microsoft Defender and the listed Windows components are excluded. One alert is raised per computer and requesting program; repeats are suppressed for seven days.

Windows: Microsoft Defender Antivirus Protection Disabled

Microsoft Defender Antivirus reported that real-time protection (event 5001), scanning for malware and potentially unwanted software (event 5010) or scanning for viruses (event 5012) was turned off. Defender does not protect the computer until the setting is turned back on. This also happens, as expected, when another antivirus product takes over from Defender.

Other products that reuse these event numbers are ignored: the rule requires the Microsoft Defender Antivirus provider and its Operational channel. All occurrences on the same computer are grouped under one alert.

Requires collection of the "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational" channel.

Windows: Multiple Logon Failure Followed by Logon Success

This rule is triggered when a sequence of multiple failed login attempts followed immediately by a successful login from the same IP address or source is detected. This unusual sequence of events may indicate a possible unauthorized access attempt using a brute force or password guessing technique. The purpose of this rule is to identify suspicious patterns of login activity and alert you to potential unauthorized access attempts. A successful logon (4624) alerts when the same computer recorded ten failed logons (4625) for the same account from the same source within the previous five minutes. Computer accounts (names ending in $) are skipped: their passwords are machine-generated and they make up almost half of all successful logons.

Windows: New User Account Created

A new local or domain user account was created (event 4720). A local account is recorded by the computer where it was created; a domain account is recorded by the domain controller that processed the request. This is an awareness alert: creating accounts is often routine, but an unexpected account is a common way to keep access to a system.

Accounts created by the same account on the same computer or domain controller are grouped under one alert. Bulk provisioning and Windows LAPS automatic account management therefore produce one alert per computer, with later accounts as child alerts.

Requires the "Audit User Account Management" success audit.

Windows: New Windows Service Created to start from windows root path. Suspicious event as the binary may have been dropped using Windows Admin Shares

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Windows: Office Application Spawned Command or Script Interpreter

Detects an Office/document application (winword, excel, outlook, etc.) spawning a command or script interpreter - a classic macro/phishing payload execution chain.

Windows: Pass the Hash Activity

A network logon carries the specific artifacts Pass-the-Hash tooling
leaves behind: an NTLM logon (LogonProcessName NtLmSsp) with KeyLength 0
and SubjectUserSid S-1-0-0 (no real originating account, since the
attacker never had the plaintext password), or a LogonType 9
(NewCredentials, e.g. runas /netonly) via the seclogo provider. Legitimate
interactive/network logons carry a real key length and a real subject.

Windows: Password, Lockout or Kerberos Policy Changed

The account policy of a computer or domain changed (event 4739): password rules, account lockout, forced logoff or domain attributes. Or the domain's Kerberos policy changed (event 4713), which controls how long sign-in tickets last. Microsoft recommends alerting on any change to these settings. They are usually applied by the system when a Group Policy change reaches the computer, so the account shown is often SYSTEM.

Changes by the same account on the same computer are grouped under one alert.

Requires the "Audit Authentication Policy Change" success audit.

Windows: Persistence via PowerShell profile

Identifies the creation or modification of a PowerShell profile. PowerShell profile is a script that is executed when PowerShell starts to customize the user environment, which can be abused by attackers to persist in a environment where PowerShell is common.

Windows: Possible Brute Force Attack

This rule is triggered when a pattern of repeated and rapid login attempts from the same IP address or source is detected. These login attempts may target specific user accounts or services in an attempt to crack passwords through automated brute force. The purpose of this rule is to identify possible malicious unauthorized access attempts and prevent a brute force attack against the system. It counts failed logons (4625) on one computer from one source (the network address, else the workstation name, else the domain-qualified account), whichever accounts they target, so password spraying that tries each account only a few times is caught as well. Ten failures within five minutes raise one alert per computer and source; repeats are suppressed for seven days.

Windows: Possible ransomware attack detected. Multiple File Deletion.

Detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring multiple file write/modification events (Event ID 4663) with write access masks in user directories within a short timeframe. Modern ransomware typically encrypts files in-place rather than deleting them, making write access monitoring more effective than deletion monitoring alone. Fifty accesses with the same write access mask by one account on one computer within five minutes raise one alert per computer and account; repeats are suppressed for seven days.

Windows: Possible ransomware attack detected. Ransomware Note Creation.

Ransomware, is a type of malware that prevents users from accessing their system or personal files and requires payment of a ransom in order to gain access to them again. Identifies ransomware attempts. A known ransomware note file has been detected, potentially indicating an active ransomware infection.

Windows: Possible ransomware attack detected. Unusual File Extensions.

Ransomware, is a type of malware that prevents users from accessing their system or personal files and requires payment of a ransom in order to gain access to them again. Identifies ransomware attempts. Files with unusual file extensions have been detected, potentially indicating encrypted files created by ransomware.

Windows: Printer driver failed to load, possible remote code execution using PrinterNightmare exploit: CVE-2021-34527

Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.

Windows: Ransomware Recovery Inhibition (Shadow Copy / Backup Deletion)

Detects deletion of Volume Shadow Copies / backups and disabling of Windows recovery (vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy, wbadmin, bcdedit) - a near-universal ransomware precursor and almost never legitimate.

Windows: Remote File Download via Desktopimgdownldr Utility

Identifies the desktopimgdownldr utility being used to download a remote file. An adversary may use desktopimgdownldr to download arbitrary files as an alternative to certutil.

Windows: Scheduled Task Created with Suspicious Action

A scheduled task was created whose action runs a command interpreter,
encoded PowerShell, or a living-off-the-land binary commonly abused for
download-and-execute (mshta, certutil, regsvr32, rundll32, bitsadmin,
wscript/cscript) -- or that points at a Temp/AppData path. Scheduled
tasks are one of the most common persistence mechanisms; a legitimate
task's action is almost always a signed, fixed application path, not an
interpreter invocation.

Windows: Suspicious PowerShell (Encoded / Download Cradle / AMSI Bypass)

Detects high-risk PowerShell script-block content: download cradles, encoded/hidden execution, reflective loading and AMSI bypass markers. Matches the 4104 script-block text (not the -EncodedCommand flag, to avoid benign false positives). v1.3.0: excludes the benign injected PSBreakpoint/AMSI "sentinel" instrumentation harness (markers: sentinelbreakpoints, \windows\sentinel\, Po_wer_Spl_oit_Indicators) that otherwise false-positives on the literal "AmsiInitFailed" token it emits on every PowerShell session. The exclusion is per-script-block, so a real payload executed through the harness is a separate 4104 event and still fires.

Windows: Suspicious Print Spooler SPL File Created

Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Print Spooler service including CVE-2020-1048 and CVE-2020-1337.

Windows: Suspicious PrintSpooler Service Executable File Creation

Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Print Spooler service. For more information refer to the following CVE's - CVE-2020-1048, CVE-2020-1337 and CVE-2020-1300 and verify that the impacted system is patched

Windows: Suspicious Scheduled Task Created

Detects creation of a scheduled task whose action runs a script interpreter, encoded command, or a user/temp/remote path - a common persistence and lateral-execution technique.

Windows: Suspicious Service Installation

A service was installed with an executable path outside the normal system
locations, or one that runs a command interpreter / encoded PowerShell
directly -- the pattern PsExec, Cobalt Strike and similar lateral-movement
and persistence tooling use (T1569.002 for one-shot remote execution via a
short-lived service; T1543.003 when the service is left behind for
persistence). A legitimate installer's service almost always points at its
own Program Files binary, not System32\cmd.exe or a Temp/AppData path.

Windows: SysKey Registry Subkey Access

A handle was requested or an operation performed against one of the four
LSA registry subkeys (JD, GBG, Skew1, Data) that together encode the
SysKey/bootkey used to encrypt the local SAM database. Reading these is
the first step credential-dumping tools (Mimikatz lsadump::sam,
secretsdump.py) take to decrypt SAM offline -- normal administration
never touches these specific subkeys. Narrower and higher-fidelity than
generic SAM hive access (sam_database_access.yaml), which this
complements rather than duplicates.

Windows: UAC Bypass Attempt via Privileged IFileOperation COM Interface

Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via DLL side-loading. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.

Windows: Unauthorized RMM Tool Service Installation

A service was installed for a remote-monitoring-and-management (RMM) tool
-- Mesh Agent or TacticalRMM -- that this environment doesn't officially
deploy. These are legitimate admin tools, but ransomware affiliates and
initial-access brokers (e.g. the Emotet-to-ransomware chain this
technique is documented from) commonly abuse them for persistent,
encrypted C2 that blends in with normal remote-support traffic, since
installing one gives full remote control without needing a custom
implant.

Windows: Unusual File Modification by dns.exe

Identifies an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe, the process responsible for Windows DNS Server services, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation.

Windows: Unusual Process Network Connection

Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection.

Windows: User logged using Remote Desktop Connection from loopback address, possible exploit over reverse tunneling using stolen credentials

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Windows: Windows Firewall Turned Off

Windows Defender Firewall was switched off for one or more network profiles (event 2003, or event 2082 on newer Windows versions). Microsoft's firewall protocol specification defines setting type 1 as the firewall on/off switch, with value 0 meaning off; while it is off, the computer blocks no network traffic for that profile. The Profiles field names the profile: 1 domain, 2 private, 4 public.

The rule reads the numeric setting instead of the translated text, so it works in every Windows language. Changes by the same program and account on the same computer are grouped under one alert, so a management tool that switches the firewall repeatedly produces one alert per computer.

Requires collection of the "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall" channel.