AWS
Detection rules for AWS data sources. Each rule includes its MITRE ATT&CK mapping, impact rating, and a description of what it detects. These rules analyze events with the data type aws, which the AWS CloudWatch integration sends.
This category contains 81 detection rules.
| Rule | Category | Technique | Impact (C/I/A) |
|---|---|---|---|
| AWS Account Closure Requested | Impact | T1485 - Data Destruction | C:3 / I:3 / A:3 |
| AWS Backup Deletion for Impact | Impact | T1490 - Inhibit System Recovery | C:1 / I:3 / A:3 |
| AWS CloudFormation Stack Deletion | Impact | T1485 - Data Destruction | C:1 / I:3 / A:3 |
| AWS CloudTrail Event Selector Manipulation | Defense Evasion | T1562.008 - Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS CloudTrail Log Deleted | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:2 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS CloudTrail Log Suspended | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS CloudTrail Log Updated | Impact | T1565 - Data Manipulation | C:2 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS CloudTrail Logging Disabled | Defense Evasion | T1562.008 - Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS CloudTrail Trail Created | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS CloudWatch Log Group Deletion | Impact | T1485 - Data Destruction | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS CloudWatch Log Stream Deletion | Impact | T1485 - Data Destruction | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS Compute-Intensive Instance Launch Request | Resource Hijacking | T1496 - Resource Hijacking | C:1 / I:2 / A:3 |
| AWS Config Service Disabled | Defense Evasion | T1562.008 - Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs | C:2 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS Config Service Tampering | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS Configuration Recorder Stopped | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS Console GetSigninToken Abuse | Credential Access | T1550.001 - Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS Console Logins from Different Countries | Credential Access | T1078.004 - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS Cross-Account Access Anomalies | Unauthorized Access | T1550.001 - Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token | C:3 / I:3 / A:1 |
| AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing Change for Review | Exfiltration | T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing Permission Added | Exfiltration | T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS EC2 Encryption Disabled | Impact | T1565 - Data Manipulation | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS EC2 Flow Log Deletion | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS EC2 Instance Startup Script Modified | Execution | T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS EC2 Metadata Token Requirement Relaxed | Credential Access | T1552.005 - Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS EC2 Snapshot Activity | Exfiltration | T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS EC2 Traffic Mirroring Configuration Request | Exfiltration | T1020 - Automated Exfiltration | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS EC2 VM Export Request | Exfiltration | T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS ECS/EKS Container Abuse Detection | Execution | T1610 - Deploy Container | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS Glue Development Endpoint Privilege Escalation | Privilege Escalation | T1078.004 - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS GuardDuty Detector Deletion | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS GuardDuty Detector Updated or Disabled | Defense Evasion | T1685 - Disable or Modify Cloud Logs | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS GuardDuty Finding Filter Added | Defense Evasion | T1685 - Disable or Modify Cloud Logs | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS GuardDuty High or Critical Finding | Threat Detection | Vendor threat detection | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Update | Initial Access | T1078 - Valid Accounts | C:2 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS IAM Backdoor Creation Attempts | Privilege Escalation | T1136.003 - Create Account: Cloud Account | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS IAM Deactivation of MFA Device | Impact | T1531 - Account Access Removal | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS IAM Login Profile Modified for Another User | Persistence | T1098 - Account Manipulation | C:3 / I:3 / A:1 |
| AWS IAM Password Recovery Requested | Initial Access | T1078 - Valid Accounts | C:2 / I:1 / A:0 |
| AWS IAM Privilege Escalation Path Detection | Privilege Escalation | T1098 - Account Manipulation | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS KMS Key Disabled or Deletion Scheduled | Impact | T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact | C:3 / I:3 / A:1 |
| AWS KMS Key Material Import or Deletion | System Integrity | T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact | C:3 / I:3 / A:3 |
| AWS Lambda Function URL Backdoor Creation | Persistence | T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter | C:3 / I:3 / A:1 |
| AWS Management Console Brute Force of Root User Identity | Credential Access | T1110 - Brute Force | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS Management Console Root Login | Initial Access | T1078 - Valid Accounts | C:3 / I:3 / A:3 |
| AWS Mass Resource Deletion | Impact | T1485 - Data Destruction | C:1 / I:3 / A:3 |
| AWS RDS Cluster Deletion | Impact | T1485 - Data Destruction | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS RDS Deletion Protection Disabled or Master Password Changed | Impact | T1485 - Data Destruction | C:3 / I:3 / A:1 |
| AWS RDS Publicly Accessible Restore Requested | System Integrity | T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS RDS Security Group Internet Ingress Added | Defense Evasion | T1562.007 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS RDS Snapshot Export Request Accepted | Exfiltration | T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS RDS Snapshot Sharing for Data Exfiltration | Data Exfiltration | T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS Root Account Usage Without MFA | Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access | T1078.004 - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS Root Login Without MFA | Initial Access | T1078 - Valid Accounts | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS Route 53 DNS Hijacking Attempt | Initial Access | T1584.002 - Compromise Infrastructure: DNS Server | C:3 / I:3 / A:3 |
| AWS Route 53 Domain Transfer Lock Disabled | Persistence | T1098 - Account Manipulation | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS Route 53 Domain Transfer Request Accepted | Persistence | T1098 - Account Manipulation | C:3 / I:3 / A:3 |
| AWS S3 Bucket Configuration Deletion | Defense Evasion | T1070 - Indicator Removal | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS S3 Bucket Server Access Logging Disabled | Defense Evasion | T1562.008 - Disable Cloud Logs | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS S3 Bucket Versioning Suspended | Impact | T1490 - Inhibit System Recovery | C:2 / I:3 / A:3 |
| AWS S3 Bulk Data Exfiltration Detected | Data Exfiltration | T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object | C:2 / I:1 / A:1 |
| AWS S3 Public Access Controls Relaxed | Collection | T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS SAML Role Assumption After Provider Change | Credential Access | T1556 - Modify Authentication Process | C:3 / I:3 / A:3 |
| AWS SSM SendCommand Remote Execution | Execution | T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter | C:2 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS SSO Identity Provider Configuration Changed | Credential Access | T1556 - Modify Authentication Process | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS STS Token Abuse Detection | Privilege Escalation | T1078.004 - Cloud Accounts | C:3 / I:3 / A:1 |
| AWS Secrets Manager Suspicious Access Pattern | Credential Access | T1555.006 - Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS Security Group Modifications | Defense Evasion | T1562.007 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall | C:2 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS Security Hub Disabled | Defense Evasion | T1685 - Disable or Modify Cloud Logs | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| AWS SecurityHub Finding Evasion | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:2 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS Systems Manager Command Request Accepted | Initial Access | T1566 - Phishing | C:2 / I:1 / A:1 |
| AWS Systems Manager Session Abuse | Lateral Movement | T1021 - Remote Services | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| AWS TruffleHog Credential Scanning Detected | Credential Access | T1552 - Unsecured Credentials | C:3 / I:1 / A:0 |
| AWS Unusual API Call Patterns | Discovery | T1580 - Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | C:2 / I:1 / A:1 |
| AWS WAF Access Control List Deletion | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS WAF Rule or Rule Group Deletion | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| AWS WAF and Shield Rule Modifications | Defense Evasion | T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools | C:2 / I:3 / A:3 |
| Repeated AWS Administrative Policy Attachments | Privilege Escalation | T1098 - Account Manipulation | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Repeated AWS SSO Permission Set Changes | Privilege Escalation | T1098 - Account Manipulation | C:3 / I:3 / A:1 |
| Repeated AWS VPC Flow Log Deletion Requests | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| Repeated ECS Task API Requests by an Assumed Role | System Integrity | T1610 - Deploy Container | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Repeated Malformed AWS IAM Trust Policy Updates | Privilege Escalation | T1098 - Account Manipulation | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
Rule Example
Below is an example of a rule definition for AWS Account Closure Requested (view in repository):
# Rule contract revision 2026-09-25; SDK v1.1.36 (gap-fill set).
dataTypes:
- aws
name: AWS Account Closure Requested
impact:
confidentiality: 3
integrity: 3
availability: 3
category: Impact
technique: T1485 - Data Destruction
adversary: origin
description: Identifies a CloseAccount request, the irreversible end-state of account compromise or destructive misuse.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/accounts/latest/reference/close-account.html
where: |
equals("log.awsRecordType","cloudtrail") &&
(equals("log.eventSource", "account.amazonaws.com") &&
equals("log.eventName", "CloseAccount") &&
equals("actionResult","success"))
groupBy:
- lastEvent.dataSource
- lastEvent.log.awsAccountKeyType
- lastEvent.log.awsAccountKey
- adversary.ip
- adversary.user
Rule Details
AWS Account Closure Requested
Identifies a CloseAccount request, the irreversible end-state of account compromise or destructive misuse.
Category: Impact
Technique: T1485 - Data Destruction
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:3
Rule file: aws_account_closed.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/accounts/latest/reference/close-account.html
AWS Backup Deletion for Impact
Detects deletion of AWS Backup vaults, recovery points, or backup plans which could indicate an attacker attempting to prevent recovery after a destructive attack. Removing backups is a common precursor to ransomware or data destruction campaigns.
Category: Impact
Technique: T1490 - Inhibit System Recovery
Impact: C:1 / I:3 / A:3
Rule file: aws_backup_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/API_Operations.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
AWS CloudFormation Stack Deletion
Detects deletion of CloudFormation stacks which could indicate destructive actions by an attacker or unauthorized infrastructure changes. This rule monitors for DeleteStack operations that could result in loss of critical infrastructure. Multiple stack deletions from the same user within a short time frame may indicate malicious activity.
Category: Impact
Technique: T1485 - Data Destruction
Impact: C:1 / I:3 / A:3
Rule file: cloudformation_stack_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSCloudFormation/latest/UserGuide/logging-cloudformation-api-calls.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/
AWS CloudTrail Event Selector Manipulation
Detects manipulation of CloudTrail event selectors which can be used to selectively exclude data events from logging. Attackers may use PutEventSelectors to disable logging of S3, Lambda, or DynamoDB data events to hide their data exfiltration or manipulation activities.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562.008 - Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: cloudtrail_event_selector_manipulation.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/logging-data-events-with-cloudtrail.html
AWS CloudTrail Log Deleted
Identifies the deletion of an AWS log trail. An adversary may delete trails in an attempt to evade defenses
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:2
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteTrail.html
Reference: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/cloudtrail/delete-trail.html
AWS CloudTrail Log Suspended
Identifies suspending the recording of AWS API calls and log file delivery for the specified trail. An adversary may suspend trails in an attempt to evade defenses
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: defense_evasion_cloudtrail_logging_suspended.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_StopLogging.html
Reference: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/cloudtrail/stop-logging.html
AWS CloudTrail Log Updated
Identifies an update to an AWS log trail setting that specifies the delivery of log files
Category: Impact
Technique: T1565 - Data Manipulation
Impact: C:2 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: impact_cloudtrail_logging_updated.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateTrail.html
Reference: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/cloudtrail/update-trail.html
AWS CloudTrail Logging Disabled
Detects attempts to disable CloudTrail logging which could be used to hide malicious activities and evade detection. CloudTrail provides audit logs of all AWS API calls and is critical for security monitoring and compliance.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562.008 - Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: cloudtrail_logging_disabled.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-concepts.html
AWS CloudTrail Trail Created
Identifies creation of a new CloudTrail trail, which an attacker may use to restrict which events are recorded or to ship logs to an adversary-controlled bucket.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: aws_cloudtrail_trail_created.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_CreateTrail.html
AWS CloudWatch Log Group Deletion
Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS CloudWatch log group. When a log group is deleted, all the archived log events associated with the log group are also permanently deleted
Category: Impact
Technique: T1485 - Data Destruction
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: impact_cloudwatch_log_group_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Reference: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/logs/delete-log-group.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatchLogs/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteLogGroup.html
AWS CloudWatch Log Stream Deletion
Identifies the deletion of an AWS CloudWatch log stream, which permanently deletes all associated archived log events with the stream
Category: Impact
Technique: T1485 - Data Destruction
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: impact_cloudwatch_log_stream_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Reference: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/logs/delete-log-stream.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatchLogs/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteLogStream.html
AWS Compute-Intensive Instance Launch Request
Detects a successful RunInstances request for the listed GPU or large compute instance types. These types have legitimate uses; verify authorization, requested capacity and workload. The instance type does not establish cryptomining.
Category: Resource Hijacking
Technique: T1496 - Resource Hijacking
Impact: C:1 / I:2 / A:3
Rule file: ec2_cryptomining_detection.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-types.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/
AWS Config Service Disabled
Detects attempts to disable AWS Config by stopping the configuration recorder or deleting the delivery channel. AWS Config tracks resource configuration changes and compliance, and disabling it is a common defense evasion technique.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562.008 - Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: aws_config_service_disabled.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/stop-start-recorder.html
AWS Config Service Tampering
Identifies attempts to delete an AWS Config Service resource. An adversary may tamper with Config services in order to reduce visibility into the security posture of an account and / or its workload instances
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: defense_evasion_config_service_rule_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/how-does-config-work.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html
AWS Configuration Recorder Stopped
Identifies an AWS configuration change to stop recording a designated set of resources
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: defense_evasion_configuration_recorder_stopped.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/APIReference/API_StopConfigurationRecorder.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
AWS Console GetSigninToken Abuse
Detects GetSigninToken API calls which allow federated users to get a console sign-in token. Attackers abuse this to pivot from programmatic credentials to console access, potentially bypassing MFA requirements.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1550.001 - Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: aws_console_getsignintoken_abuse.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_providers_enable-console-custom-url.html
AWS Console Logins from Different Countries
Detects successful console logins by the same principal and account from different geolocated countries within 30 minutes. VPNs, proxies and geolocation changes can produce this sequence; it does not establish impossible travel. Verify the sign-ins with the account owner.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1078.004 - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: console_login_impossible_travel.yaml
AWS Cross-Account Access Anomalies
Detects anomalous cross-account access patterns in AWS that may indicate account compromise or privilege escalation. Monitors for AssumeRole activities across different accounts where the assumed role ARN does not match the originating account ID, potentially indicating unauthorized cross-account access.
Category: Unauthorized Access
Technique: T1550.001 - Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:1
Rule file: cross_account_access_anomalies.yaml
AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing Change for Review
Detects a successful addition of EBS snapshot volume-creation permissions. Check whether the destination accounts or public group are authorized. Removing permissions does not match, and a sharing change alone does not establish a policy violation.
Category: Exfiltration
Technique: T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: ebs_snapshot_sharing_violations.yaml
Reference: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/cloud-security-atlas/attacks/sharing-ebs-snapshot/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/
AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing Permission Added
Detects a successful ModifySnapshotAttribute request that adds volume-creation permissions. Removal-only changes do not match. Review the added accounts or public group; sharing permission does not establish completed data exfiltration.
Category: Exfiltration
Technique: T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: aws_snapshot_exfiltration.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ebs-modifying-snapshot-permissions.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/
AWS EC2 Encryption Disabled
Identifies disabling of Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) encryption by default in the current region. Disabling encryption by default does not change the encryption status of your existing volumes
Category: Impact
Technique: T1565 - Data Manipulation
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: impact_ec2_disable_ebs_encryption.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/EBSEncryption.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DisableEbsEncryptionByDefault.html
AWS EC2 Flow Log Deletion
Identifies the deletion of one or more flow logs in AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). An adversary may delete flow logs in an attempt to evade defenses
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: defense_evasion_ec2_flow_log_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/ec2/delete-flow-logs.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteFlowLogs.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
AWS EC2 Instance Startup Script Modified
Detects ModifyInstanceAttribute API calls targeting userData, which modifies the EC2 instance startup script. Attackers use this for persistent code execution with root/SYSTEM privileges on instance start.
Category: Execution
Technique: T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: aws_ec2_startup_script_modification.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/user-data.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
AWS EC2 Metadata Token Requirement Relaxed
Detects a successful ModifyInstanceMetadataOptions request setting httpTokens to optional. This permits use of IMDSv1; it does not prove that instance credentials were accessed. Verify the change and instance metadata configuration.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1552.005 - Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: ec2_metadata_abuse.yaml
Reference: https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/exploitation/ec2-metadata-ssrf/
AWS EC2 Snapshot Activity
An attempt was made to modify AWS EC2 snapshot attributes. Snapshots are sometimes shared by threat actors in order to exfiltrate bulk data from an EC2 fleet. If the permissions were modified, verify the snapshot was not shared with an unauthorized or unexpected AWS account
Category: Exfiltration
Technique: T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_ModifySnapshotAttribute.html
AWS EC2 Traffic Mirroring Configuration Request
Identifies a successful request to create a traffic mirror filter, rule, session or target. Inspect the configuration and destination to determine whether packet mirroring is active and authorized; creating a filter alone does not prove that traffic was captured.
Category: Exfiltration
Technique: T1020 - Automated Exfiltration
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: exfiltration_ec2_full_network_packet_capture_detected.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_TrafficMirrorFilter.html
Reference: https://github.com/easttimor/aws-incident-response
AWS EC2 VM Export Request
Identifies a CreateInstanceExportTask request, including rejected requests. Check actionResult and the vendor error fields to determine whether AWS accepted it. This event does not prove that an export completed or that data was exfiltrated.
Category: Exfiltration
Technique: T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: exfiltration_ec2_vm_export_failure.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vm-import/latest/userguide/vmexport.html#export-instance
AWS ECS/EKS Container Abuse Detection
Detects suspicious container operations in AWS ECS and EKS including registration of task definitions with privileged mode, host network access, or sensitive volume mounts. Attackers may deploy malicious containers to execute code, escalate privileges, or access host resources.
Category: Execution
Technique: T1610 - Deploy Container
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: ecs_eks_container_abuse.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/security.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610/
AWS Glue Development Endpoint Privilege Escalation
Detects creation or modification of AWS Glue development endpoints which can be used for privilege escalation. An attacker can pass an IAM role to a Glue dev endpoint and then use it to execute code with that role's permissions, potentially escalating privileges.
Category: Privilege Escalation
Technique: T1078.004 - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: aws_glue_privilege_escalation.yaml
Reference: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/escalating-aws-iam-privileges-undocumented-codestar-api/
AWS GuardDuty Detector Deletion
Identifies the deletion of an Amazon GuardDuty detector. Upon deletion, GuardDuty stops monitoring the environment and all existing findings are lost
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Reference: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/guardduty/delete-detector.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteDetector.html
AWS GuardDuty Detector Updated or Disabled
Identifies an UpdateDetector call that disables a GuardDuty detector, stopping threat detection while avoiding a clean DeleteDetector signal.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1685 - Disable or Modify Cloud Logs
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: aws_guardduty_detector_updated.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateDetector.html
AWS GuardDuty Finding Filter Added
Identifies PutFilters adding a GuardDuty filter that suppresses specific finding types, blinding the account to particular compromise indicators.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1685 - Disable or Modify Cloud Logs
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: aws_guardduty_finding_filter.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/APIReference/API_PutFilters.html
AWS GuardDuty High or Critical Finding
Detects an explicitly identified GuardDuty EventBridge finding with severity from 7 through 10. The CloudWatch log group must receive those EventBridge events; GuardDuty management API calls are not findings. Review the original finding detail for affected resources and threat context.
Category: Threat Detection
Technique: Vendor threat detection
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: guardduty_high_severity_findings.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_findings.html
AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Update
Identifies attempts to modify an AWS IAM Assume Role Policy. An adversary may attempt to modify the AssumeRolePolicy of a misconfigured role in order to gain the privileges of that role
Category: Initial Access
Technique: T1078 - Valid Accounts
Impact: C:2 / I:2 / A:1
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
Reference: https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/5-privesc-attack-vectors-in-aws
AWS IAM Backdoor Creation Attempts
Detects potential IAM backdoor creation attempts through suspicious IAM user creation, access key generation, or policy attachment activities that could provide persistent access.
Category: Privilege Escalation
Technique: T1136.003 - Create Account: Cloud Account
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: iam_backdoor_creation_attempts.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_manage.html
AWS IAM Deactivation of MFA Device
Identifies the deactivation of a specified multi-factor authentication (MFA) device and removes it from association with the user name for which it was originally enabled. In AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM), a device must be deactivated before it can be deleted
Category: Impact
Technique: T1531 - Account Access Removal
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: impact_iam_deactivate_mfa_device.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
Reference: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/deactivate-mfa-device.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeactivateMFADevice.html
AWS IAM Login Profile Modified for Another User
Detects UpdateLoginProfile API calls where the modifier is potentially different from the target user. This can indicate an attacker changing another user's password to maintain access or enable console login for a compromised programmatic-only account.
Category: Persistence
Technique: T1098 - Account Manipulation
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:1
Rule file: aws_iam_login_profile_modification.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_passwords_admin-change-user.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
AWS IAM Password Recovery Requested
Identifies AWS IAM password recovery requests. An adversary may attempt to gain unauthorized AWS access by abusing password recovery mechanisms.
Potential false positives
Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be requesting changes in your environment. Password reset attempts from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
Category: Initial Access
Technique: T1078 - Valid Accounts
Impact: C:2 / I:1 / A:0
Rule file: initial_access_password_recovery.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
Reference: https://www.cadosecurity.com/2020/06/11/an-ongoing-aws-phishing-campaign/
AWS IAM Privilege Escalation Path Detection
Detects IAM actions commonly chained for privilege escalation including PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion, AttachUserPolicy, and AssumeRole. Attackers exploit these API calls to elevate their permissions within an AWS environment by creating new policy versions with elevated privileges or assuming roles with higher access.
Category: Privilege Escalation
Technique: T1098 - Account Manipulation
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: iam_privilege_escalation_paths.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_manage.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
Reference: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/
AWS KMS Key Disabled or Deletion Scheduled
Identifies DisableKey or ScheduleKeyDeletion, rendering a customer master key unusable so protected data becomes unreadable, a destructive or ransomware hallmark.
Category: Impact
Technique: T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:1
Rule file: aws_kms_key_disabled_or_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/APIReference/API_DisableKey.html
AWS KMS Key Material Import or Deletion
Identifies successful ImportKeyMaterial or DeleteImportedKeyMaterial requests. Verify the key, authorization and dependent resources. These are key-management operations and do not by themselves prove encryption of data or ransomware. Review key lifecycle and recovery plans before taking any containment action.
Category: System Integrity
Technique: T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:3
Rule file: aws_kms_key_material_import.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/importing-keys.html
AWS Lambda Function URL Backdoor Creation
Detects creation of Lambda function URLs which provide direct HTTPS endpoints to Lambda functions. Attackers may create function URL configurations as backdoor endpoints for persistent access, command execution, or data exfiltration without requiring API Gateway.
Category: Persistence
Technique: T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:1
Rule file: lambda_url_backdoor.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-urls.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
AWS Management Console Brute Force of Root User Identity
Identifies a high number of failed authentication attempts to the AWS management console for the Root user identity. An adversary may attempt to brute force the password for the Root user identity, as it has complete access to all services and resources for the AWS account
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1110 - Brute Force
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: credential_access_root_console_failure_brute_force.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
AWS Management Console Root Login
Identifies a successful login to the AWS Management Console by the Root user.
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.
Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases.
Potential false positives
It’s strongly recommended that the root user is not used for everyday tasks, including the administrative ones. Verify whether the IP address, location, and/or hostname should be logging in as root in your environment. Unfamiliar root logins should be investigated immediately. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
Category: Initial Access
Technique: T1078 - Valid Accounts
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:3
Rule file: initial_access_console_login_root.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
AWS Mass Resource Deletion
Detects mass deletion of AWS resources which could indicate destructive attack or insider threat. Monitors for multiple delete operations across various AWS services within a 10-minute window.
Category: Impact
Technique: T1485 - Data Destruction
Impact: C:1 / I:3 / A:3
Rule file: mass_resource_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-concepts.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/
AWS RDS Cluster Deletion
Identifies the deletion of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Aurora database cluster or global database cluster
Category: Impact
Technique: T1485 - Data Destruction
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: impact_rds_cluster_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/
Reference: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/rds/delete-db-cluster.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteDBCluster.html
Reference: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/rds/delete-global-cluster.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGlobalCluster.html
AWS RDS Deletion Protection Disabled or Master Password Changed
Identifies ModifyDBInstance that disables DeletionProtection or changes MasterUserPassword, preparing destructive deletion or seizing database control.
Category: Impact
Technique: T1485 - Data Destruction
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:1
Rule file: aws_rds_deletion_protection_or_password_changed.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_ModifyDBInstance.html
AWS RDS Publicly Accessible Restore Requested
Identifies a successful database restore request explicitly setting publiclyAccessible to true. Verify the task status, subnet routing, security groups and approval. Request acceptance does not prove that the database is reachable from the internet or that any data was exfiltrated.
Category: System Integrity
Technique: T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: aws_rds_public_restore.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/USER_RestoreFromSnapshot.html
AWS RDS Security Group Internet Ingress Added
Detects a successful AuthorizeDBSecurityGroupIngress request allowing 0.0.0.0/0. Revoking a permission does not add exposure. Review the database security group and business justification.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562.007 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: rds_security_group_changes.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html
AWS RDS Snapshot Export Request Accepted
Identifies a successful StartExportTask API request. Review the export destination and task status; API acceptance does not establish that the export completed.
Category: Exfiltration
Technique: T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: exfiltration_rds_snapshot_export.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_StartExportTask.html
AWS RDS Snapshot Sharing for Data Exfiltration
Detects RDS snapshot sharing modifications that could be used for data exfiltration. Attackers may share database snapshots with external AWS accounts to exfiltrate sensitive data, or make snapshots public to download them from an attacker-controlled account.
Category: Data Exfiltration
Technique: T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: rds_snapshot_exfiltration.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/USER_ShareSnapshot.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/
AWS Root Account Usage Without MFA
Detects usage of AWS root account without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Root account usage should be avoided for daily operations and must always use MFA when necessary. This is a critical security violation as the root account has unrestricted access to all AWS resources.
Category: Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access
Technique: T1078.004 - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: root_account_usage_without_mfa.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
AWS Root Login Without MFA
Identifies attempts to login to AWS as the root user without using multi-factor authentication (MFA). Amazon AWS best practices indicate that the root user should be protected by MFA
Category: Initial Access
Technique: T1078 - Valid Accounts
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
AWS Route 53 DNS Hijacking Attempt
Detects potential DNS hijacking attempts through unauthorized changes to Route 53 DNS records. This rule monitors for ChangeResourceRecordSets operations that could indicate an attacker modifying DNS entries to redirect traffic.
Category: Initial Access
Technique: T1584.002 - Compromise Infrastructure: DNS Server
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:3
Rule file: route53_dns_hijacking.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/Route53/latest/DeveloperGuide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html
AWS Route 53 Domain Transfer Lock Disabled
Identifies when a transfer lock was removed from a Route 53 domain. It is recommended to refrain from performing this action unless intending to transfer the domain to a different registrar
Category: Persistence
Technique: T1098 - Account Manipulation
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: persistence_route_53_domain_transfer_lock_disabled.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/Route53/latest/APIReference/API_Operations_Amazon_Route_53.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/Route53/latest/APIReference/API_domains_DisableDomainTransferLock.html
AWS Route 53 Domain Transfer Request Accepted
Identifies an accepted Route 53 Domains request to transfer a domain to another AWS account. Check the destination account and transfer status; request acceptance does not establish that the transfer completed.
Category: Persistence
Technique: T1098 - Account Manipulation
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:3
Rule file: persistence_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/Route53/latest/APIReference/API_Operations_Amazon_Route_53.html
AWS S3 Bucket Configuration Deletion
Identifies the deletion of various Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) bucket configuration components
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1070 - Indicator Removal
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: defense_evasion_s3_bucket_configuration_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_DeleteBucketPolicy.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_DeleteBucketReplication.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_DeleteBucketCors.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_DeleteBucketEncryption.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_DeleteBucketLifecycle.html
AWS S3 Bucket Server Access Logging Disabled
Identifies PutBucketLogging with no target bucket, disabling server-access logging on a bucket and removing the per-object audit trail.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562.008 - Disable Cloud Logs
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: aws_s3_bucket_logging_disabled.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketLogging.html
AWS S3 Bucket Versioning Suspended
Detects when S3 bucket versioning is suspended via PutBucketVersioning. Disabling versioning is a cloud ransomware preparation technique that prevents recovery of overwritten or deleted objects from version history.
Category: Impact
Technique: T1490 - Inhibit System Recovery
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:3
Rule file: aws_s3_versioning_disabled.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/Versioning.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
AWS S3 Bulk Data Exfiltration Detected
Detects bulk GetObject operations from S3 buckets indicating potential data exfiltration. When an attacker gains access to AWS credentials, they may attempt to download large amounts of data from S3 buckets in a short period.
Category: Data Exfiltration
Technique: T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object
Impact: C:2 / I:1 / A:1
Rule file: s3_bulk_data_exfiltration.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-logging.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/
AWS S3 Public Access Controls Relaxed
Detects a successful public ACL change or removal/relaxation of bucket Public Access Block controls. Account-level and bucket policies can still prevent public access. Review the effective controls before concluding that data is exposed.
Category: Collection
Technique: T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: s3_bucket_public_exposure.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/access-control-block-public-access.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/
AWS SAML Role Assumption After Provider Change
Detects a successful AssumeRoleWithSAML request after a successful SAML provider creation or update in the same AWS account and collector within 24 hours. The provider change can be by a different administrator. This sequence requires investigation and does not prove that a SAML assertion was forged.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1556 - Modify Authentication Process
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:3
Rule file: aws_golden_saml_attack.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
AWS SSM SendCommand Remote Execution
Detects AWS Systems Manager SendCommand API calls which allow remote command execution on EC2 instances. Attackers with sufficient IAM permissions abuse SSM to execute commands across multiple instances without SSH/RDP access.
Category: Execution
Technique: T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: aws_ssm_sendcommand_abuse.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/run-command.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
AWS SSO Identity Provider Configuration Changed
Detects changes to AWS SSO identity provider configuration including directory association and external IdP configuration changes. Modifying the identity provider can enable impersonation of any user in the organization.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1556 - Modify Authentication Process
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: aws_sso_idp_change.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/manage-your-identity-source.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
AWS STS Token Abuse Detection
Detects potential abuse of AWS STS AssumeRole operations. This rule identifies when roles are assumed from unusual IP addresses or when there are multiple role assumptions in a short time period, which could indicate lateral movement or privilege escalation. The rule specifically flags AssumeRole operations performed without MFA authentication.
Category: Privilege Escalation
Technique: T1078.004 - Cloud Accounts
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:1
Rule file: sts_token_abuse.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html
Reference: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-aws-sts-assumeroot
AWS Secrets Manager Suspicious Access Pattern
Detects unusual access patterns to AWS Secrets Manager that could indicate credential theft or unauthorized access attempts. This rule monitors for multiple GetSecretValue or BatchGetSecretValue operations from the same source within a short time window, which may indicate an attacker attempting to harvest credentials.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1555.006 - Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: secrets_manager_suspicious_access.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/userguide/monitoring-cloudtrail.html
AWS Security Group Modifications
Detects modifications to AWS security groups that could weaken network security posture. Monitors for changes that add permissive rules or remove restrictive rules, particularly those allowing unrestricted access (0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0).
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562.007 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: security_group_modifications.yaml
AWS Security Hub Disabled
Identifies DisableSecurityHub, turning off the central threat dashboard and aggregate findings, an anti-forensics step.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1685 - Disable or Modify Cloud Logs
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: aws_securityhub_disabled.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/APIReference/API_DisableSecurityHub.html
AWS SecurityHub Finding Evasion
Detects attempts to suppress or manipulate AWS SecurityHub findings through BatchUpdateFindings, DeleteInsight, or UpdateFindings operations. Attackers use these to hide evidence of their activities from security monitoring.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: aws_securityhub_finding_evasion.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/securityhub-findings.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
AWS Systems Manager Command Request Accepted
Identifies a successful SendCommand API request. Review the document, parameters and target instances for authorization, and inspect command execution results separately. API acceptance does not establish command execution success.
Category: Initial Access
Technique: T1566 - Phishing
Impact: C:2 / I:1 / A:1
Rule file: initial_access_via_system_manager.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/ssm-plugins.html
AWS Systems Manager Session Abuse
Detects suspicious use of AWS Systems Manager (SSM) for remote access including StartSession, SendCommand, and SendSSHPublicKey. Attackers use SSM to establish interactive sessions or execute commands on EC2 instances without requiring direct SSH access or security group changes.
Category: Lateral Movement
Technique: T1021 - Remote Services
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: ssm_session_abuse.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/session-manager.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
AWS TruffleHog Credential Scanning Detected
Detects TruffleHog credential scanning tool activity in AWS CloudTrail logs identified by its characteristic user agent string. TruffleHog is used to scan for exposed secrets and credentials in AWS environments.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1552 - Unsecured Credentials
Impact: C:3 / I:1 / A:0
Rule file: aws_trufflehog_scanning.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/
AWS Unusual API Call Patterns
Detects unusual API call patterns in AWS that may indicate unauthorized access or reconnaissance activities. This rule triggers when multiple sensitive API calls are made from the same source IP within a short time window, suggesting potential enumeration or discovery activities by attackers.
Category: Discovery
Technique: T1580 - Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
Impact: C:2 / I:1 / A:1
Rule file: unusual_api_call_patterns.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580/
AWS WAF Access Control List Deletion
Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS Web Application Firewall (WAF) access control list
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: defense_evasion_waf_acl_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Reference: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/waf-regional/delete-web-acl.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/APIReference/API_wafRegional_DeleteWebACL.html
AWS WAF Rule or Rule Group Deletion
Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule or rule group
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: defense_evasion_waf_rule_or_rule_group_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Reference: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/waf/delete-rule-group.html
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/APIReference/API_waf_DeleteRuleGroup.html
AWS WAF and Shield Rule Modifications
Detects modifications or deletions of AWS WAF web ACLs and rules which could be used to remove web application protections before launching an attack. Attackers may disable WAF rules to allow malicious traffic or remove rate limiting protections.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:3
Rule file: waf_shield_rule_modifications.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/waf-chapter.html
Repeated AWS Administrative Policy Attachments
Detects repeated successful attachment of the AWS-managed AdministratorAccess or IAMFullAccess policy to a role or user by the same actor and account within one hour. Review whether these grants were approved. The request alone does not identify a Lambda execution role.
Category: Privilege Escalation
Technique: T1098 - Account Manipulation
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: lambda_privilege_escalation.yaml
Reference: https://bishopfox.com/blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
Repeated AWS SSO Permission Set Changes
Detects repeated successful permission-set creation, policy attachment, deletion or inline-policy updates in AWS SSO from the same source and account. These administrative operations do not establish a failed login or compromised SSO session.
Category: Privilege Escalation
Technique: T1098 - Account Manipulation
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:1
Rule file: aws_sso_suspicious_activities.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/what-is.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
Repeated AWS VPC Flow Log Deletion Requests
Detects repeated successful DeleteFlowLogs API requests from the same source and AWS account within 24 hours. Review the flow-log identifiers and any per-resource failures in the response. API success alone does not prove that every requested log was deleted.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: vpc_flow_log_anomalies.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html
Repeated ECS Task API Requests by an Assumed Role
Detects repeated successful DescribeTaskDefinition, RunTask or StartTask requests by an assumed role. These CloudTrail management calls do not establish access to the task credential endpoint or credential theft. Review the role, task and requested operations for authorization.
Category: System Integrity
Technique: T1610 - Deploy Container
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: aws_ecs_credential_theft.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/task-iam-roles.html
Repeated Malformed AWS IAM Trust Policy Updates
Detects repeated UpdateAssumeRolePolicy requests rejected with MalformedPolicyDocument or MalformedPolicyDocumentException by the same actor and account. This is a rejected trust-policy update, not a failed AssumeRole authentication or password brute force. Review the proposed policy and administrative workflow.
Category: Privilege Escalation
Technique: T1098 - Account Manipulation
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: credential_access_aws_iam_assume_role_brute_force.yaml
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateAssumeRolePolicy.html
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/