Office 365
Detection rules for Office 365 data sources. Each rule includes its MITRE ATT&CK mapping, impact rating, and a description of what it detects. These rules analyze events with the data type o365, which the Microsoft 365 (Office 365 Management Activity API) integration sends.
This category contains 73 detection rules.
| Rule | Category | Technique | Impact (C/I/A) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abnormal Guest User Invitation Activity | Identity and Access Management | Account Creation | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Audit Log Tampering Detection | Defense Evasion | T1070.001 - Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Azure AD Integration Suspicious Activity | Identity and Access Management | T1098 - Account Manipulation | C:2 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Conditional Access Bypass Detection | Defense Evasion | T1550 - Use Alternate Authentication Material | C:2 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Data Loss Prevention Policy Violation | Data Loss Prevention | T1213 - Data from Information Repositories | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Exchange Admin Configuration Changes | Configuration Changes | T1098 - Account Manipulation | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Information Barriers Policy Violation | Privilege Escalation | Valid Accounts | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Insider Risk Indicator Detection | Collection | Data from Local System | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| M365 Data Exfiltration to Unsanctioned Application | Exfiltration | T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| M365 Mailbox PST Export Detected | Collection | T1114.002 - Email Collection: Remote Email Collection | C:3 / I:1 / A:1 |
| M365 New Federated Domain Added | Persistence | T1556 - Modify Authentication Process | C:3 / I:3 / A:3 |
| M365 Suspicious OAuth Application File Downloads | Collection | T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| MFA Fatigue Push Spam Attack Detection | Credential Access | T1621 - Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Mass Email Deletion Detected | Data Loss | T1114 - Email Collection | C:2 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Microsoft 365 CAS Mailbox Auto-Forward Set | Collection | T1114.003 - Email Collection | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Microsoft 365 Conditional Access Policy Disabled or Weakened | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:3 / A:1 |
| Microsoft 365 DLP Policy Removed | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Microsoft 365 Detection of a connection to a .onion domain | Command and Control | T1090 - Proxy | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| Microsoft 365 Double-Extension Executable Staged | Collection | T1036 - Masquerading | C:2 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Microsoft 365 Exchange Anti-Phish Policy Deletion | Initial Access | T1566 - Phishing | C:2 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Microsoft 365 Exchange Anti-Phish Rule Modification | Initial Access | T1566 - Phishing | C:2 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Microsoft 365 Exchange Malware Filter Policy Deletion | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Microsoft 365 Exchange Malware Filter Rule Modification | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Microsoft 365 Exchange Safe Attachment Rule Disabled | Defense Evasion | T1562 - Impair Defenses | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Microsoft 365 Exchange Safe Link Policy Disabled | Initial Access | T1566 - Phishing | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| Microsoft 365 Exchange Transport Rule Creation | Exfiltration | T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Microsoft 365 Exchange Transport Rule Modification | Exfiltration | T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Microsoft 365 File Malware Detected | Execution | T1204 - User Execution | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Microsoft 365 Mailbox Audit Bypass Associated | Defense Evasion | T1562.008 - Disable Cloud Logs | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Microsoft 365 Mailbox Folder Permission Granted | Privilege Escalation | T1098 - Account Manipulation | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Microsoft 365 Mailbox Login by Non-Owner | Credential Access | T1078.004 - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Microsoft 365 Mailbox Mass Item Access | Collection | T1114.003 - Email Collection from Remote System | C:3 / I:1 / A:1 |
| Microsoft 365 Possible Successful Password Guessing detected | Credential Access | T1110.001 - Brute Force | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| Microsoft 365 Security Alert Added | Impact | T1566 - Phishing | C:2 / I:1 / A:1 |
| Microsoft 365 Service Principal Creation | Persistence | T1136.003 - Create Account: Cloud Account | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Microsoft Teams External User Phishing Detection | Initial Access | T1566 - Phishing | C:2 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Microsoft Teams Mass Deletion by Single User | Impact | T1485 - Data Destruction | C:2 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Multi-Geo Data Violations | Data Loss | T1030 - Data Transfer Size Limits | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| O365 Admin Role Assignment | Persistence | T1136 - Create Account | C:2 / I:3 / A:0 |
| O365 Admin Role/Permission Granted | Persistence | T1136 - Create Account | C:2 / I:3 / A:0 |
| O365 Audit Log Purge | Defense Evasion | T1070 - Indicator Removal | C:2 / I:3 / A:0 |
| O365 Excessive Single Sign-On Logon Errors | Credential Access | T1110 - Brute Force | C:2 / I:3 / A:2 |
| O365 Inbox Forward Rule with Email Exfiltration | Collection | T1114.003 - Email Forwarding Rule | C:3 / I:1 / A:0 |
| O365 Mailbox Auto-Forwarding (Set-Mailbox) | Collection | T1114.003 - Email Collection: Email Forwarding Rule | C:2 / I:1 / A:0 |
| Office 365 Anti-Phishing Policy Bypass Detected | Defense Evasion | T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools | C:3 / I:3 / A:1 |
| Office 365 App Consent Grants Detected | Persistence | T1098.003 - Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials | C:3 / I:3 / A:1 |
| Office 365 Calendar Delegate Changed | Administrative Awareness | T1098.002 - Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions | C:1 / I:1 / A:0 |
| Office 365 Forms and Sway Phishing Detection | Initial Access | T1566 - Phishing | C:2 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Office 365 Inbox Rule Changed | Administrative Awareness | T1564.008 - Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules | C:1 / I:1 / A:0 |
| Office 365 Inbox Rule Changed | Administrative Awareness | T1564.008 - Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules | C:1 / I:1 / A:0 |
| Office 365 Mail Connector Changed | Administrative Awareness | T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account | C:1 / I:1 / A:0 |
| Office 365 Mail Flow Rule Modified | Defense Evasion | T1564.008 - Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Office 365 Mailbox Client Access Changed | Administrative Awareness | T1114.002 - Email Collection: Remote Email Collection | C:1 / I:1 / A:0 |
| Office 365 Mailbox Delegate Permission Changed | Administrative Awareness | T1098.002 - Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions | C:1 / I:1 / A:0 |
| Office 365 Mailbox Export to PST | Data Exfiltration | T1114.002 - Email Collection: Remote Email Collection | C:3 / I:1 / A:1 |
| Office 365 Mailbox Folder Permission Changed | Administrative Awareness | T1098.002 - Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions | C:1 / I:1 / A:0 |
| Office 365 OAuth Application Anomalous Activity | Credential Access | T1528 - Steal Application Access Token | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Office 365 Safe Attachment Policy Violation | Initial Access | T1566.001 - Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| OneDrive Mass File Access Detected | Data Reconnaissance | T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object | C:3 / I:1 / A:2 |
| Potential Password Spraying of Microsoft 365 User Accounts | Credential Access | T1110 - Brute Force | C:3 / I:2 / A:2 |
| Power Apps Data Connector Suspicious Activity | Data Exfiltration | T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Power BI Suspicious Data Export | Data Exfiltration | T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service | C:3 / I:1 / A:1 |
| Safe Links Click Pattern Anomaly | Defense Evasion | T1204.001 - User Execution: Malicious Link | C:2 / I:3 / A:1 |
| Service Principal Credential Addition | Persistence | T1098.001 - Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials | C:3 / I:3 / A:1 |
| SharePoint Mass File Download Detected | Data Exfiltration | T1213 - Data from Information Repositories | C:3 / I:1 / A:2 |
| SharePoint Permission Escalation Detection | Privilege Escalation | T1098 - Account Manipulation | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Suspicious Compliance Alert Activity | Policy and Compliance | T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Suspicious External Sharing Activity | Data Loss Prevention | T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Suspicious Mail Forwarding Rule Creation | Collection | T1114.003 - Email Collection: Email Forwarding Rule | C:2 / I:1 / A:0 |
| Suspicious Power Automate Flow Activity | Process Automation Abuse | Automated Collection | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| Suspicious Teams Message Export Activity | Data Exfiltration | T1114 - Email Collection | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
| Threat Intelligence Alert Pattern | Initial Access | Phishing | C:3 / I:3 / A:2 |
| eDiscovery Abuse Detection | Data Exfiltration | T1074 - Data Staged | C:3 / I:2 / A:1 |
Rule Example
Below is an example of a rule definition for Abnormal Guest User Invitation Activity (view in repository):
# Rule version v1.0.0
dataTypes:
- o365
name: Abnormal Guest User Invitation Activity
impact:
confidentiality: 3
integrity: 2
availability: 1
category: Identity and Access Management
technique: Account Creation
adversary: origin
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
description: |
Detects unusual spikes in guest user invitations which could indicate an attempt to establish persistence through external accounts or potential data exfiltration preparation by adding unauthorized external collaborators.
Next Steps:
1. Review the user account initiating the invitations for any signs of compromise
2. Verify the legitimacy of the invited external users and their business justification
3. Check if the inviting user has appropriate permissions for guest invitations
4. Examine the invited users' email domains for suspicious or unexpected organizations
5. Review any subsequent activity by the invited guest users
6. Validate that the invitation frequency aligns with normal business processes
7. Consider implementing additional approval workflows for guest user invitations
where: |
equals("log.Workload", "AzureActiveDirectory") &&
(
equals("action", "Invite external user") ||
equals("action", "InviteGuest") ||
equals("action", "Add guest to group") ||
equals("action", "Guest user invite redeemed")
) &&
equals("actionResult", "success")
afterEvents:
- with:
- field: origin.user
operator: filter_term
value: '{{.origin.user}}'
- field: action
operator: filter_term
value: 'Invite external user'
within: 1h
count: 10
groupBy:
- adversary.user
Rule Details
Abnormal Guest User Invitation Activity
Detects unusual spikes in guest user invitations which could indicate an attempt to establish persistence through external accounts or potential data exfiltration preparation by adding unauthorized external collaborators.
Category: Identity and Access Management
Technique: Account Creation
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: guest_user_invitation_spikes.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
Audit Log Tampering Detection
Detects attempts to tamper with audit logs by disabling auditing, modifying audit configurations, or clearing audit data. This could indicate an attempt to hide malicious activities.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1070.001 - Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: audit_log_tampering.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-enable-disable
Azure AD Integration Suspicious Activity
Detects suspicious Azure Active Directory integration events including multiple failed authentication attempts, unusual role assignments, or bulk user modifications that could indicate an attempted compromise of identity management systems. This rule identifies patterns of authentication failures, privilege escalations, and bulk account modifications that may suggest malicious activity targeting the organization's identity infrastructure.
Category: Identity and Access Management
Technique: T1098 - Account Manipulation
Impact: C:2 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: azure_ad_integration_events.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
Conditional Access Bypass Detection
Detects attempts to bypass conditional access policies through various methods including legacy authentication, trusted location manipulation, or session token abuse. This rule identifies when users successfully authenticate despite conditional access policy failures or use legacy authentication methods that may bypass modern security controls.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1550 - Use Alternate Authentication Material
Impact: C:2 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: conditional_access_bypasses.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/overview
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/
Data Loss Prevention Policy Violation
Detects violations of Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policies including attempts to share, access, or exfiltrate sensitive information such as credit card numbers, social security numbers, or confidential business data.
This rule triggers when Office 365 DLP policies detect unauthorized handling of sensitive data across Exchange, SharePoint, OneDrive, Teams, or Security Compliance Center workloads.
Category: Data Loss Prevention
Technique: T1213 - Data from Information Repositories
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: dlp_policy_violations.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/dlp-learn-about-dlp
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/
Exchange Admin Configuration Changes
Detects changes to Exchange administrative configuration that could impact security settings, user permissions, or mail flow policies. This rule monitors for successful execution of critical Exchange administrative cmdlets that can affect organizational security posture.
Category: Configuration Changes
Technique: T1098 - Account Manipulation
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: exchange_admin_changes.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
Information Barriers Policy Violation
Detects violations of information barrier policies designed to prevent conflicts of interest by restricting communications and collaborations between specific groups or individuals within the organization. Information barriers are critical security controls that prevent unauthorized information sharing between different business units or roles.
Category: Privilege Escalation
Technique: Valid Accounts
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: information_barriers_violations.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/information-barriers
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
Insider Risk Indicator Detection
Detects insider risk indicators such as unusual data access patterns, mass downloads, sensitive data exfiltration attempts, or policy violations that may indicate malicious insider activity or compromised accounts.
Category: Collection
Technique: Data from Local System
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: insider_risk_indicators.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/insider-risk-management
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/
M365 Data Exfiltration to Unsanctioned Application
Detects Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps (CASB) alerts for data exfiltration to unsanctioned applications. This indicates sensitive organizational data is being transferred to unauthorized cloud services.
Category: Exfiltration
Technique: T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: m365_data_exfiltration_unsanctioned.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/discovered-apps
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/
M365 Mailbox PST Export Detected
Detects PST file exports from Microsoft 365 mailboxes. Bulk email export to PST format is a primary method of email exfiltration, often performed by compromised admin accounts or insider threats.
Category: Collection
Technique: T1114.002 - Email Collection: Remote Email Collection
Impact: C:3 / I:1 / A:1
Rule file: m365_pst_export.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/ediscovery-export-search-results
M365 New Federated Domain Added
Detects when a new federated domain is added to Microsoft 365. Adding federated domains is a critical attack technique that enables Golden SAML attacks, allowing attackers to forge authentication tokens and maintain persistent backdoor access to the tenant.
Category: Persistence
Technique: T1556 - Modify Authentication Process
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:3
Rule file: m365_federated_domain_added.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/enterprise/plan-for-third-party-ssl-certificates
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
M365 Suspicious OAuth Application File Downloads
Detects Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps alerts for suspicious OAuth application file download activities. Malicious OAuth apps granted consent by phished users can mass-download files from SharePoint and OneDrive.
Category: Collection
Technique: T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: m365_oauth_app_file_downloads.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/investigate-anomaly-alerts
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/
MFA Fatigue Push Spam Attack Detection
Detects MFA fatigue attacks where an attacker repeatedly triggers MFA push notifications to overwhelm a user into accepting. Multiple failed MFA challenges followed by a successful authentication strongly indicates an MFA fatigue attack.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1621 - Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: mfa_fatigue_push_spam.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/authentication/concept-mfa-howitworks
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621/
Mass Email Deletion Detected
Detects when a user performs mass deletion of emails which could indicate data destruction, covering tracks, or malicious insider activity. Triggers when one user writes 200 or more HardDelete records (messages purged from the Recoverable Items folder) or 5,000 or more SoftDelete records (messages permanently deleted or removed from Deleted Items) within one hour. Emptying a large Deleted Items folder in Outlook produces many SoftDelete records, so the SoftDelete threshold is set far above everyday cleanup. One alert is raised per user; repeats for the same user are suppressed for seven days.
Category: Data Loss
Technique: T1114 - Email Collection
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: mass_email_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-mailboxes
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/
Microsoft 365 CAS Mailbox Auto-Forward Set
Detects Set-CASMailbox establishing a ForwardingAddress or ForwardingSmtpAddress, redirecting mailbox mail externally at the CAS level to evade visible inbox rules.
Category: Collection
Technique: T1114.003 - Email Collection
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: o365_cas_autoforward.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-casmailbox
Microsoft 365 Conditional Access Policy Disabled or Weakened
Detects DisableConditionalAccessPolicy or UpdateConditionalAccessPolicy that removes or weakens conditional access, disabling the MFA and network gates protecting the tenant.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:1
Rule file: o365_conditional_access_changed.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/overview
Microsoft 365 DLP Policy Removed
Detects Remove-DlpPolicy deleting a data-loss-prevention policy, removing the control that detects and blocks sensitive data leaving the tenant.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: o365_dlp_policy_removed.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/dlp-policy
Microsoft 365 Detection of a connection to a .onion domain
Tor is a software suite and network that provides increased anonymity on the Internet. It creates a multi-hop proxy network and utilizes multilayer encryption to protect both the message and routing information. Tor utilizes Onion Routing, in which messages are encrypted with multiple layers of encryption; at each step in the proxy network, the topmost layer is decrypted and the contents forwarded on to the next node until it reaches its destination.
Category: Command and Control
Technique: T1090 - Proxy
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/software/
Microsoft 365 Double-Extension Executable Staged
Detects files on OneDrive for Business or SharePoint Online whose name contains a hidden ".exe." double extension (e.g., "invoice.exe.pdf", "report.exe.docx"). Attackers use double extensions to disguise malicious executables as documents so users and security tooling treat them as benign.
Verified against live Unified Audit data: file operations carry target.filename (full name) and log.SourceFileExtension (real last extension). The rule fires when the name embeds ".exe." but the true extension is not "exe".
Category: Collection
Technique: T1036 - Masquerading
Impact: C:2 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: double_extension_exe.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
Microsoft 365 Exchange Anti-Phish Policy Deletion
Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.
Adversaries may send victims emails containsing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
Identifies the deletion of an anti-phishing policy in Microsoft 365. By default, Microsoft 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Anti-phishing polices increase this protection by refining settings to better detect and prevent attacks.
Category: Initial Access
Technique: T1566 - Phishing
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: initial_access_microsoft_365_exchange_anti_phish_policy_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
Microsoft 365 Exchange Anti-Phish Rule Modification
Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.
Adversaries may send victims emails containsing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
Identifies the modification of an anti-phishing rule in Microsoft 365. By default, Microsoft 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Anti-phishing rules increase this protection by refining settings to better detect and prevent attacks.
Category: Initial Access
Technique: T1566 - Phishing
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: initial_access_microsoft_365_exchange_anti_phish_rule_mod.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
Microsoft 365 Exchange Malware Filter Policy Deletion
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
Identifies when a malware filter policy has been deleted in Microsoft 365. A malware filter policy is used to alert administrators that an internal user sent a message that containsed malware. This may indicate an account or machine compromise that would need to be investigated. Deletion of a malware filter policy may be done to evade detection.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: defense_evasion_microsoft_365_exchange_malware_filter_policy_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Microsoft 365 Exchange Malware Filter Rule Modification
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
Identifies when a malware filter rule has been deleted or disabled in Microsoft 365. An adversary or insider threat may want to modify a malware filter rule to evade detection.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: defense_evasion_microsoft_365_exchange_malware_filter_rule_mod.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Microsoft 365 Exchange Safe Attachment Rule Disabled
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
Identifies when a safe attachment rule is disabled in Microsoft 365. Safe attachment rules can extend malware protections to include routing all messages and attachments without a known malware signature to a special hypervisor environment. An adversary or insider threat may disable a safe attachment rule to exfiltrate data or evade defenses.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562 - Impair Defenses
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: defense_evasion_microsoft_365_exchange_safe_attach_rule_disabled.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Microsoft 365 Exchange Safe Link Policy Disabled
When it comes to protecting its users, Microsoft takes the threat of phishing seriously. Spoofing is a common technique that's used by attackers. Spoofed messages appear to originate from someone or somewhere other than the actual source. This technique is often used in phishing campaigns that are designed to obtain user credentials. The anti-spoofing technology in EOP specifically examines forgery of the From header in the message body (used to display the message sender in email clients). When EOP has high confidence that the From header is forged, the message is identified as spoofed.
Identifies when a Safe Link policy is disabled in Microsoft 365. Safe Link policies for Office applications extend phishing protection to documents that contains hyperlinks, even after they have been delivered to a user.
Category: Initial Access
Technique: T1566 - Phishing
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: initial_access_microsoft_365_exchange_safelinks_disabled.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
Microsoft 365 Exchange Transport Rule Creation
Exfiltration consists of techniques that adversaries may use to steal data from your network. Once they’ve collected data, adversaries often package it to avoid detection while removing it. This can include compression and encryption. Techniques for getting data out of a target network typically include transferring it over their command and control channel or an alternate channel and may also include putting size limits on the transmission.
Identifies a transport rule creation in Microsoft 365. Exchange Online mail transport rules should be set to not forward email to domains outside of your organization as a best practice. An adversary may create transport rules to exfiltrate data.
Category: Exfiltration
Technique: T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: exfiltration_microsoft_365_exchange_transport_rule_creation.yaml
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
Microsoft 365 Exchange Transport Rule Modification
Exfiltration consists of techniques that adversaries may use to steal data from your network. Once they’ve collected data, adversaries often package it to avoid detection while removing it. This can include compression and encryption. Techniques for getting data out of a target network typically include transferring it over their command and control channel or an alternate channel and may also include putting size limits on the transmission.
Identifies when a transport rule has been disabled or deleted in Microsoft 365. Mail flow rules (also known as transport rules) are used to identify and take action on messages that flow through your organization. An adversary or insider threat may modify a transport rule to exfiltrate data or evade defenses.
Category: Exfiltration
Technique: T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: exfiltration_microsoft_365_exchange_transport_rule_mod.yaml
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
Microsoft 365 File Malware Detected
Detects FileMalwareDetected where Defender for Office 365 identified malware embedded in a SharePoint, OneDrive, or Teams file, indicating staged payload delivery.
Category: Execution
Technique: T1204 - User Execution
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: o365_file_malware_detected.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/file-threat-protection
Microsoft 365 Mailbox Audit Bypass Associated
Detects Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation exempting an identity from mailbox auditing so its mailbox actions are not recorded, an anti-forensics step.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562.008 - Disable Cloud Logs
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: o365_mailbox_audit_bypass.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-mailboxauditbypassassociation
Microsoft 365 Mailbox Folder Permission Granted
Detects Add-MailboxFolderPermission granting folder-level mailbox access to another identity, enabling covert read or write of specific folders for data collection.
Category: Privilege Escalation
Technique: T1098 - Account Manipulation
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: o365_mailbox_folder_permission.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/add-mailboxfolderpermission
Microsoft 365 Mailbox Login by Non-Owner
Detects a successful MailboxLogin performed against a mailbox that is not the signing-in user's own, a common account-takeover and business-email-compromise step.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1078.004 - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: o365_mailbox_login_nonowner.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-logs-exchange-online
Microsoft 365 Mailbox Mass Item Access
Detects one identity producing 2,000 or more MailItemsAccessed records within one hour. Exchange Online writes a MailItemsAccessed record whenever any client reads mail, and it groups the messages one client reads within two minutes into a single record, so ordinary mail use stays far below this volume. A volume this large points to automated mailbox scraping, a new client syncing the whole mailbox, or an application reading mail in bulk. One alert is raised per identity; repeats for the same identity are suppressed for seven days.
Category: Collection
Technique: T1114.003 - Email Collection from Remote System
Impact: C:3 / I:1 / A:1
Rule file: o365_mailbox_mass_access.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-investigate-accounts
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Microsoft 365 Possible Successful Password Guessing detected
Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1110.001 - Brute Force
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006
Microsoft 365 Security Alert Added
Detects AlertAdded events surfacing a new Defender security alert for the tenant, providing a direct triage signal for identity and email threats.
Category: Impact
Technique: T1566 - Phishing
Impact: C:2 / I:1 / A:1
Rule file: o365_security_alert_added.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/identity-threat-protection-alert-types
Microsoft 365 Service Principal Creation
Detects creation of a new service principal (application) in Microsoft Entra ID. Attackers frequently register a rogue service principal to establish persistent, credential-based access to the tenant that survives password resets and MFA.
Verified against live Unified Audit data: operation "Add service principal." (Workload AzureActiveDirectory, actionResult success).
Category: Persistence
Technique: T1136.003 - Create Account: Cloud Account
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: service_principal_creation.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/howto-create-service-principal-portal
Reference: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Microsoft%20365/Hunting%20Queries
Microsoft Teams External User Phishing Detection
Detects suspicious external user interactions in Microsoft Teams including external users sending messages with links, file sharing from external users, and mass external user additions. Teams is increasingly used as a phishing vector to bypass email security controls.
Category: Initial Access
Technique: T1566 - Phishing
Impact: C:2 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: teams_external_user_abuse.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/communicate-with-users-from-other-organizations
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
Microsoft Teams Mass Deletion by Single User
Detects a single user deleting multiple Microsoft Teams in a short period. Mass team deletion is an indicator of data destruction or an attacker covering their tracks before exiting the tenant.
Verified against the drop list: operation "TeamDeleted" is NOT dropped (ingested). Microsoft's reference query thresholds at >3 teams; this rule fires on a first TeamDeleted then 4 more within 24h (count 4 => total 5).
Category: Impact
Technique: T1485 - Data Destruction
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: teams_mass_deletion.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/
Multi-Geo Data Violations
Detects violations of multi-geo data residency policies including unauthorized data movements between regions, cross-geo access violations, or attempts to bypass geo-restrictions. This rule identifies activities such as site geo moves, cross-geo file operations, and data location parameter modifications that may indicate unauthorized data transfer or policy violations.
Category: Data Loss
Technique: T1030 - Data Transfer Size Limits
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: multi_geo_data_violations.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/enterprise/microsoft-365-multi-geo
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030/
O365 Admin Role Assignment
Detects when an administrator assigns a directory role (Add member to role.) in Azure Active Directory. This activity can indicate account compromise or insider threat where an attacker escalates privileges to maintain persistence within the tenant. Ordinary group membership changes and user consent grants are not role assignments and do not trigger this rule. One alert is raised per actor and assigned account; repeats of the same assignment are suppressed for seven days.
Category: Persistence
Technique: T1136 - Create Account
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:0
Rule file: o365_admin_group_permission_grant.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
O365 Admin Role/Permission Granted
Detects when an admin role or elevated permission is granted to a user in Office 365 /
Azure Active Directory. This is detected via "Update user." operations in the Azure
Active Directory workload that include user type modifications in the raw log data.
Note: This rule uses a proxy signal ("Update user." with raw-text probe) as the
canonical "Add member to role." events are not available in the current data.
Category: Persistence
Technique: T1136 - Create Account
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:0
Rule file: o365_admin_role_granted_proxy.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
O365 Audit Log Purge
Detects the two Microsoft 365 operations that remove investigation data: a Data Security Investigations purge job being started (DSIPurgeStarted, which deletes the items found by an investigation from their mailboxes and sites) and an audit log search job being deleted (AuditSearchDeleted). Attackers commonly destroy evidence to cover their tracks after compromising an environment, and both operations are rare administrator actions. Ordinary mailbox purges (HardDelete) are not audit data; mass purging is covered by the Mass Email Deletion rule. One alert is raised per user and operation; repeats are suppressed for seven days.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1070 - Indicator Removal
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:0
Rule file: o365_audit_log_purge.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
O365 Excessive Single Sign-On Logon Errors
Credential Access consists of techniques for stealing credentials like account names and passwords. Techniques used to get credentials include keylogging or credential dumping. Using legitimate credentials can give adversaries access to systems, make them harder to detect, and provide the opportunity to create more accounts to help achieve their goals.
Identifies accounts with a high number of single sign-on (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate an attempt to brute force a password or SSO token.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1110 - Brute Force
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: credential_access_user_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
O365 Inbox Forward Rule with Email Exfiltration
Detects the creation or modification of inbox forwarding rules followed by a burst
of SendAs activity from the same user within 1 hour. This pattern indicates an
attacker who has created email forwarding rules to redirect sensitive emails and
is actively exfiltrating data by sending emails as the compromised user. This is
a common data exfiltration technique used after initial access is gained.
Category: Collection
Technique: T1114.003 - Email Forwarding Rule
Impact: C:3 / I:1 / A:0
Rule file: o365_inbox_forward_rule_exfiltration.yaml
O365 Mailbox Auto-Forwarding (Set-Mailbox)
Set-Mailbox set a forwarding address on a mailbox (ForwardingSmtpAddress or ForwardingAddress). Mail delivered to the mailbox is then forwarded to that address without any inbox rule, a common step after a mailbox is taken over.
Check whether the address is outside the organization, who made the change and recent sign-ins for that account. Clearing forwarding, or changing only DeliverToMailboxAndForward, does not raise this alert. The alert does not by itself establish compromise or an external recipient.
Category: Collection
Technique: T1114.003 - Email Collection: Email Forwarding Rule
Impact: C:2 / I:1 / A:0
Rule file: mailbox_auto_forwarding_set_mailbox.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchangepowershell/set-mailbox?view=exchange-ps
Office 365 Anti-Phishing Policy Bypass Detected
Detects potential bypasses or modifications to anti-phishing policies including changes to safe sender lists, domain exclusions, or policy disabling that could allow phishing emails to reach users. This rule identifies successful administrative actions on anti-phishing configurations that could weaken email security defenses.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:1
Rule file: anti_phishing_policy_bypasses.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-phishing-policies-about
Office 365 App Consent Grants Detected
Detects when OAuth consent is granted to an application in Office 365. Attackers may use malicious OAuth apps to gain persistent access to user data without requiring credentials. This technique allows attackers to maintain access even after password changes.
Category: Persistence
Technique: T1098.003 - Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:1
Rule file: app_consent_grants.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/detect-and-remediate-illicit-consent-grants
Office 365 Calendar Delegate Changed
A user was added to or removed from another mailbox owner’s calendar delegation. The operation can be routine scheduling administration, but changes who can manage calendar items.
Review the actor, affected object, change request and authorized owner. This alert reports an audited configuration change; it does not by itself establish compromise, an external recipient, or a currently enabled setting.
Category: Administrative Awareness
Technique: T1098.002 - Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions
Impact: C:1 / I:1 / A:0
Rule file: awareness_calendar_delegation.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Office 365 Forms and Sway Phishing Detection
Detects suspicious usage of Microsoft Forms and Sway for phishing page creation. Attackers leverage these legitimate Microsoft services to host phishing pages that bypass email security controls and appear trustworthy to victims due to the microsoft.com domain.
Category: Initial Access
Technique: T1566 - Phishing
Impact: C:2 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: forms_sway_phishing.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
Office 365 Inbox Rule Changed
A user or administrator created, changed, enabled, disabled or removed an inbox rule with an Exchange command, for example from Outlook on the web or PowerShell. Rules that move or delete mail can hide messages from the mailbox owner. New and modified rules with forwarding settings raise the separate forwarding alert instead.
Outlook desktop records its rule saves as UpdateInboxRules and writes them repeatedly for the same rules, usually without any rule change, so those records do not raise this alert.
Review the actor, affected object, change request and authorized owner. This alert reports an audited configuration change; it does not by itself establish compromise, an external recipient, or a currently enabled setting.
Category: Administrative Awareness
Technique: T1564.008 - Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules
Impact: C:1 / I:1 / A:0
Rule file: awareness_inbox_rule_changed.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Office 365 Inbox Rule Changed
A user or administrator created, changed, enabled, disabled or removed an inbox rule with an Exchange command, for example from Outlook on the web or PowerShell. Rules that move or delete mail can hide messages from the mailbox owner. New and modified rules with forwarding settings raise the separate forwarding alert instead.
Outlook desktop records its rule saves as UpdateInboxRules and writes them repeatedly for the same rules, usually without any rule change, so those records do not raise this alert.
Review the actor, affected object, change request and authorized owner. This alert reports an audited configuration change; it does not by itself establish compromise, an external recipient, or a currently enabled setting.
Category: Administrative Awareness
Technique: T1564.008 - Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules
Impact: C:1 / I:1 / A:0
Rule file: collection_microsoft_365_new_inbox_rule.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Office 365 Mail Connector Changed
An inbound or outbound Exchange Online mail connector was created, changed or removed. Review routing and authentication settings in the audited object and confirm the administrator intended the change.
Review the actor, affected object, change request and authorized owner. This alert reports an audited configuration change; it does not by itself establish compromise, an external recipient, or a currently enabled setting.
Category: Administrative Awareness
Technique: T1537 - Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Impact: C:1 / I:1 / A:0
Rule file: awareness_mail_connectors.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Office 365 Mail Flow Rule Modified
Detects modifications to mail flow rules (transport rules) in Office 365. Attackers may create or modify mail flow rules to redirect, delete, or hide emails, bypassing security controls or exfiltrating data. Mail flow rules can be used to automatically delete emails containing specific keywords, forward sensitive emails to external addresses, or modify email content.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1564.008 - Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: mail_flow_rule_changes.yaml
Reference: https://admindroid.com/how-to-audit-transport-rule-changes-report-in-microsoft-365
Office 365 Mailbox Client Access Changed
An administrator changed client access settings on a mailbox with Set-CASMailbox. Examine the changed protocol or access setting and the affected mailbox before deciding whether follow-up is needed.
Review the actor, affected object, change request and authorized owner. This alert reports an audited configuration change; it does not by itself establish compromise, an external recipient, or a currently enabled setting.
Category: Administrative Awareness
Technique: T1114.002 - Email Collection: Remote Email Collection
Impact: C:1 / I:1 / A:0
Rule file: awareness_mailbox_client_access.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Office 365 Mailbox Delegate Permission Changed
An administrator granted a mailbox permission such as FullAccess with Add-MailboxPermission, granted SendAs with Add-RecipientPermission, or supplied GrantSendOnBehalfTo to Set-Mailbox. These permissions let another account read the mailbox or send mail as, or on behalf of, its owner. Removing a permission does not raise this alert.
Some changes are recorded under an Exchange service account instead of the administrator who made them. Review the actor, affected object, change request and authorized owner. This alert reports an audited configuration change; it does not by itself establish compromise, an external recipient, or a currently enabled setting.
Category: Administrative Awareness
Technique: T1098.002 - Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions
Impact: C:1 / I:1 / A:0
Rule file: mailbox_delegation_abuse.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Office 365 Mailbox Export to PST
Detects creation of mailbox export requests which generate PST files containing email data. Attackers with compromised admin credentials may use New-MailboxExportRequest or eDiscovery export to bulk exfiltrate email data from target mailboxes.
Category: Data Exfiltration
Technique: T1114.002 - Email Collection: Remote Email Collection
Impact: C:3 / I:1 / A:1
Rule file: mailbox_export_pst.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/policy-and-compliance/ediscovery/export-results-to-pst
Office 365 Mailbox Folder Permission Changed
A folder permission on someone else's mailbox was added, modified or removed, either with an Exchange administrator cmdlet or through an audited mailbox client. This can grant or revoke access to the messages in that folder.
Changes owners make to their own mailbox, such as sharing a calendar, do not raise this alert; the audit record shows them with logon type Owner or with the mailbox owner as the actor. Neither do changes made by Microsoft service accounts, which the audit record marks with ExternalAccess set to true and a Windows security identifier (S-1-5-...) as the actor, for example when Microsoft 365 configures group mailboxes.
Review the actor, affected object, change request and authorized owner. This alert reports an audited configuration change; it does not by itself establish compromise, an external recipient, or a currently enabled setting.
Category: Administrative Awareness
Technique: T1098.002 - Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions
Impact: C:1 / I:1 / A:0
Rule file: awareness_mailbox_folder_permissions.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Office 365 OAuth Application Anomalous Activity
Detects anomalous OAuth application activities including suspicious consent patterns, high-privilege permission grants, or rapid consent events from a single user which may indicate compromised accounts or malicious OAuth apps. This rule identifies when users consent to OAuth applications with high-risk permissions such as Mail access, Files access, or User.ReadWrite permissions, followed by multiple consent events from the same IP address.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1528 - Steal Application Access Token
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: oauth_app_anomalies.yaml
Reference: https://office365itpros.com/2023/12/15/oauth-apps-security/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528/
Office 365 Safe Attachment Policy Violation
Detects violations of Safe Attachment policies including malicious files blocked during detonation, policy modifications that reduce protection, or attempts to bypass attachment scanning that could lead to malware delivery. This rule identifies when Safe Attachment policies are modified, disabled, or when malicious attachments are detected and blocked by Office 365 security controls.
Category: Initial Access
Technique: T1566.001 - Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: safe_attachment_violations.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/safe-attachments-about
OneDrive Mass File Access Detected
Detects when one identity accesses OneDrive files at a very high volume: 1,000 or more FileAccessed, FileAccessedExtended or FilePreviewed records within one hour, counted separately for each operation. Microsoft does not log FileAccessed again for the same user and file within five minutes, so 1,000 FileAccessed records in an hour means at least 84 different files, far beyond ordinary work. This volume can indicate automated data collection, reconnaissance, or preparation for data exfiltration by a compromised account, an insider or a malicious script. Security scanners, backup tools and anonymous sharing links can reach it too. One alert is raised per identity; repeats for the same identity are suppressed for seven days.
Category: Data Reconnaissance
Technique: T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object
Impact: C:3 / I:1 / A:2
Rule file: onedrive_mass_file_access.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/
Potential Password Spraying of Microsoft 365 User Accounts
Credential Access consists of techniques for stealing credentials like account names and passwords. Techniques used to get credentials include keylogging or credential dumping. Using legitimate credentials can give adversaries access to systems, make them harder to detect, and provide the opportunity to create more accounts to help achieve their goals.
Identifies a high number (50) of failed Microsoft 365 sign-ins (UserLoginFailed) from a single IP address within 10 minutes, which could be indicative of a password spraying attack. An adversary may attempt a password spraying attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. Company internet gateways carry many ordinary failures, such as multi-factor prompts and expired sessions, so the threshold is set above that everyday volume. One alert is raised per IP address; repeats for the same address are suppressed for seven days.
Category: Credential Access
Technique: T1110 - Brute Force
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:2
Rule file: credential_access_microsoft_365_potential_password_spraying_attack.yaml
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
Power Apps Data Connector Suspicious Activity
Detects creation or modification of Power Apps data connectors that could lead to unauthorized data access or exfiltration from corporate data sources. This rule identifies suspicious Power Apps activities including app creation/modification, data connection changes, and data export/import operations that may indicate an attempt to access or exfiltrate sensitive organizational data.
Category: Data Exfiltration
Technique: T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: power_apps_data_leaks.yaml
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/power-platform/admin/audit-data-user-activity
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/
Power BI Suspicious Data Export
Detects bulk Power BI report exports and data downloads that may indicate data exfiltration. Attackers with access to Power BI may export reports and underlying datasets containing sensitive business data.
Category: Data Exfiltration
Technique: T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact: C:3 / I:1 / A:1
Rule file: power_bi_data_export.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/admin/service-admin-auditing
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/
Safe Links Click Pattern Anomaly
Detects unusual patterns in Safe Links click behavior that may indicate phishing attempts or malicious URL access. This rule monitors for multiple clicks on suspicious URLs from the same user within a short timeframe, which could indicate either a persistent phishing campaign or user behavior that poses security risks.
Category: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1204.001 - User Execution: Malicious Link
Impact: C:2 / I:3 / A:1
Rule file: safe_links_click_patterns.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/safe-links-about
Service Principal Credential Addition
Detects addition of credentials (secrets or certificates) to application registrations and service principals. Attackers may add new credentials to existing service principals to establish persistent backdoor access to the tenant without relying on user credentials.
Category: Persistence
Technique: T1098.001 - Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:1
Rule file: service_principal_credential_addition.yaml
SharePoint Mass File Download Detected
Detects when a user downloads an unusually large number of files from SharePoint or OneDrive within a short time period, which could indicate data exfiltration or insider threat activity. This rule triggers when one identity writes 500 or more FileDownloaded records within one hour; downloading a folder as a ZIP file writes one record per file. One alert is raised per identity; repeats for the same identity are suppressed for seven days.
Category: Data Exfiltration
Technique: T1213 - Data from Information Repositories
Impact: C:3 / I:1 / A:2
Rule file: sharepoint_mass_downloads.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/
SharePoint Permission Escalation Detection
Detects escalation of SharePoint permissions including adding site collection administrators and granting site admin privileges to external users. These changes can provide unauthorized access to sensitive SharePoint data and configuration settings.
Category: Privilege Escalation
Technique: T1098 - Account Manipulation
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: sharepoint_permission_escalation.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/manage-site-collection-administrators
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
Suspicious Compliance Alert Activity
Detects suspicious patterns in compliance-related activities including alert suppression, policy modifications, or audit log tampering that could indicate attempts to evade security monitoring or hide malicious activities in Office 365 Security & Compliance Center.
Category: Policy and Compliance
Technique: T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: compliance_alert_patterns.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Suspicious External Sharing Activity
Detects unauthorized or suspicious external sharing activities in SharePoint and OneDrive that could indicate data exfiltration attempts or policy violations when sharing sensitive content with external parties.
Category: Data Loss Prevention
Technique: T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: external_sharing_violations.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/
Suspicious Mail Forwarding Rule Creation
An inbox rule was created or changed with a ForwardTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo or RedirectTo setting. Rules that send a mailbox's mail to an outside address are a common sign that the mailbox has been taken over.
Check the destination in the rule parameters, who made the change and recent sign-ins for the mailbox. Clearing a forwarding setting in an existing rule also raises this alert. The alert does not by itself establish compromise or an external recipient.
Category: Collection
Technique: T1114.003 - Email Collection: Email Forwarding Rule
Impact: C:2 / I:1 / A:0
Rule file: mail_forwarding_rules.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Suspicious Power Automate Flow Activity
Detects creation or modification of Power Automate flows that could be used for automated data exfiltration or unauthorized process automation. This rule identifies suspicious Power Automate activity including flow creation, modification, sharing, and connection management that may indicate malicious automation attempts.
Category: Process Automation Abuse
Technique: Automated Collection
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: power_automate_abuse.yaml
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/power-platform/admin/audit-data-user-activity
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119/
Suspicious Teams Message Export Activity
Detects when Teams messages are exported or read in bulk through Microsoft Graph API calls, which could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate chat history and shared files from Microsoft Teams. Microsoft logs MessagesListed only when an application retrieves messages through the Graph API, never for the Teams client, and backup or compliance tools do this continuously. The rule triggers when the identity behind an export or listing operation has 100 or more Teams records within one hour. One alert is raised per identity and application; repeats are suppressed for seven days.
Category: Data Exfiltration
Technique: T1114 - Email Collection
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: teams_data_exfiltration.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-teams-audit-log-events
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/
Threat Intelligence Alert Pattern
Detects threat intelligence alerts from Office 365 security services indicating known malicious activities, threat actor patterns, or indicators of compromise matching threat intelligence feeds. These alerts are generated when Microsoft's threat intelligence systems identify suspicious activities, malicious file attachments, URLs, or communication patterns associated with known threat actors.
Category: Initial Access
Technique: Phishing
Impact: C:3 / I:3 / A:2
Rule file: threat_intelligence_alerts.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender/threat-analytics
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
eDiscovery Abuse Detection
Detects potential abuse of eDiscovery features including excessive searches, exports, or unauthorized access to sensitive data through eDiscovery operations. This rule identifies users performing multiple eDiscovery actions within a short timeframe, which could indicate malicious data staging or exfiltration attempts.
Category: Data Exfiltration
Technique: T1074 - Data Staged
Impact: C:3 / I:2 / A:1
Rule file: ediscovery_abuse.yaml
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/ediscovery-search-for-activities-in-the-audit-log
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/