Shipped Flows

UTMStack v12.0.2 ships 94 ready-made response flows. They all arrive switched off. 13 of them have a trigger and can run on their own once you switch them on; the other 81 have a placeholder trigger on purpose and run only when you start them by hand or after you copy them and give the copy a trigger.

What you need to know first

  • Shipped flows (shown with a lock icon on the Flows page and listed on its System tab) cannot be edited or deleted. To change one, copy it with New flow > From an existing one. The copy is saved switched off and is yours to edit.

  • Each tenant switches shipped flows on separately.

  • Shipped flows act for real: they block addresses, disable or expire accounts, stop processes, isolate machines and shut them down. Read every command in the Code tab before you use a flow.

  • Many shipped commands put quotes around a placeholder, for example remoteip="$(alert.adversary.ip)". With the automatic quoting of UTMStack v12.0.2 those values arrive with extra quote characters. Remove the quotes around placeholders in your copy. See Placeholders.

  • Several commands were converted from UTMStack v11 and read fields that an alert may not carry (for example process names from the event). A placeholder that cannot be filled in is sent as written. Test a copy with Trigger flow against a real alert before you switch it on.

Do not switch on a shipped flow to try it out. Use Trigger flow on a test machine instead (see Flows Page). A switched-on flow runs on every matching alert, on the machine that raised it.

Flows that have a trigger

These 13 flows start when an alert with the given name is raised, once you switch them on. In each of them every step is wired to the next one on both the success and the error wire, so all steps run in order whatever the result of the previous one.

Only 6 of the 13 alert names match a correlation rule that ships with UTMStack v12.0.2. The other 7 name an alert that no shipped rule raises, so these flows run only if you add a correlation rule with exactly that name (see Building a Flow for how matching works).

Flow name (as shown)Starts on alert nameShipped rule with this name in v12.0.2PlatformStepsWhat it runs
System Linux: Possible Brute Force AttackSystem Linux: Possible Brute Force AttackYesubuntu2Blocks the attacker's address on port 22 (ufw) and kills the target user's processes; then blocks the attacker's address on all ports.
Linux - Ubuntu - Brute Force User via SSHSSH Brute Force AttemptsNoubuntu4Blocks the attacker's address on port 22 (ufw), expires the target account and shuts the machine down; then sets the adversary user's shell to nologin, shuts down again and kills the target user's processes.
Windows Server - Failed RDP Brute Force ResponseRDP Brute Force AttackNowindows2Adds an inbound Windows Firewall block rule for the attacker's address (twice, under two rule names).
Windows: Multiple remote access login failuresWindows: Multiple remote access login failuresNowindows2Adds an inbound block rule for alert.origin.ip, then a netsh inbound block rule for the attacker's address.
Windows: Possible Brute Force AttackWindows: Possible Brute Force AttackYeswindows3Adds an inbound block rule for the attacker's address (twice), then disables the adversary user account.
Windows: Multiple Logon Failure Followed by Logon SuccessWindows: Multiple Logon Failure Followed by Logon SuccessYeswindows3Blocks the attacker's address and disables the target user; blocks the address again; disables the adversary user.
Windows Server - Volume Shadow Copy DeletionVolume Shadow Copy DeletionNowindows4Kills the target process, logs off and disables the target user; kills the adversary process; disables the adversary user; logs off the target user.
Windows: Volume Shadow Copy DeletionVolume Shadow Copy DeletionNowindows4Kills the target process, disables and logs off the target user; kills the adversary process; disables the adversary user; logs off the target user.
System Linux: Attempt to Disable Syslog ServiceSystem Linux: Attempt to Disable Syslog ServiceYesubuntu3Kills the target user's processes and expires the account; sets the adversary user's shell to nologin; kills the target user's processes again.
Windows: PowerShell Keylogging ScriptWindows: PowerShell Keylogging ScriptNowindows2Kills the process by the ID and name in the event, then kills the adversary process.
Windows Server - PowerShell Empire DetectionPowerShell Empire DetectionNowindows3Kills the target process, deletes the target file and disables the target user; deletes the adversary path; disables the adversary user.
Windows Server - AdminSDHolder Abuse DetectionAdminSDHolder Abuse DetectionYeswindows2Disables the adversary user account (two attempts).
Linux - CentOS/RHEL - RHEL-Specific Kernel Exploitation AttemptRHEL-Specific Kernel Exploitation AttemptYescentos3Kills the target user's processes and expires the account; sets the adversary user's shell to nologin; kills the target user's processes again.

Linux - Ubuntu - Brute Force User via SSH shuts the machine down. Do not switch it on for servers that must stay up.

Flows without a trigger

The other 81 flows have the trigger name IS TODO-set-the-correlation-rule-that-triggers-this. No alert has that name, so they never start on their own. The file header explains why: a broad condition would run these destructive actions on every alert, and choosing which detection should run them is your decision.

You can use them in two ways:

  1. Copy and complete. Copy the flow, set a real trigger (usually the alert name of one correlation rule), remove quotes around placeholders, check the platform and shell, test with Trigger flow, then switch the copy on.

  2. Run by hand from an alert. The lightning button in an alert's row in Threat Management > Alerts, and the lightning button in the side panel of Live Operations, look for the shipped flow made for that kind of alert and the host's platform. The button shows the flow's name ("Finding a response…" while it looks, "No system flow covers this alert" when there is none). Click it to start that flow once on the alert's host. You see "Response triggered" or "Could not trigger the response". This is a manual start, so it needs the soar.execute permission (Administrator role), and it works even though the flow is switched off.

Standard responses

These 30 flows are named after an attack type, a platform, the side of the alert they act on, and the action, for example iocMatch-linux-host-block-ip. The alert response button picks from them by that name.

Flow name (as shown)FilePlatformWhat it runs
Disable changed useraccountChange-macos-target-disable-usermacosRuns pwpolicy -setstatus On for the target user.
Kill tunnel processc2tunnel-linux-host-kill-processubuntuSaves the matching processes to /var/log/utmstack-evidence.txt, then kills processes matching the target process.
Kill tunnel processc2tunnel-windows-host-kill-processwindowsSaves the process details to C:\\utmstack-c2-evidence.txt, then stops the target process.
Block threat IPcloud-linux-host-block-ipubuntuBlocks the attacker's address in the iptables INPUT and FORWARD chains.
Kill exfil processexfil-windows-host-kill-processwindowsSaves the process details to C:\\utmstack-exfil-evidence.txt, then stops the target process.
Disable compromised usergeneric-linux-target-disable-userubuntuSets the target user's shell to nologin, or locks the account.
Disable compromised usergeneric-windows-target-disable-userwindowsDisables the target user account.
Block threat IPiocMatch-linux-host-block-ipubuntuBlocks the attacker's address inbound and outbound (iptables).
Block threat IPiocMatch-macos-host-block-ipmacosAdds inbound and outbound block rules to /etc/pf.utmstack.conf and loads that file in pf.
Block threat IPiocMatch-windows-host-block-ipwindowsAdds inbound and outbound Windows Firewall block rules for the attacker's address.
Disable compromised userkerberosTicket-windows-target-disable-userwindowsDisables the target user account.
Block threat IPperimeterDetect-linux-host-block-ipubuntuBlocks the attacker's address inbound (iptables).
Block threat IPperimeterDetect-windows-host-block-ipwindowsAdds an inbound block rule for the attacker's address.
Remove persistence and disable userpersistence-linux-host-remove-persistenceubuntuSaves cron jobs and enabled services to /var/log/utmstack-persistence-evidence.txt; then removes the crontab of the account the agent runs as and disables the target user.
Remove persistence and disable userpersistence-macos-host-remove-persistencemacosLists LaunchAgents and LaunchDaemons into an evidence file; then unloads the target user's LaunchAgents and runs pwpolicy -setstatus On for the target user.
Remove persistence and disable userpersistence-windows-host-remove-persistencewindowsSaves scheduled tasks and Run keys to C:\\utmstack-persistence-evidence.txt; then deletes the scheduled task named after the target process and disables the target user.
Reset account passwordphishing-linux-host-reset-passwordubuntuSets a new password for the target user with passwd --stdin, or forces a password change at next sign-in.
Reset account passwordphishing-macos-host-reset-passwordmacosRuns dscacheutil -q user for the target user. This looks the user up; it does not change the password.
Reset account passwordphishing-windows-host-reset-passwordwindowsRuns net user for the target user with the * password option.
Isolate hostransomware-linux-host-isolateubuntuBrings every network interface except loopback down.
Isolate hostransomware-macos-host-isolatemacosBrings every hardware network port down.
Kill reverse shell processreverseShell-linux-host-kill-processubuntuSaves the matching processes to /var/log/utmstack-evidence.txt, then kills processes matching the target process.
Kill reverse shell processreverseShell-windows-host-kill-processwindowsSaves the process details to C:\\utmstack-revshell-evidence.txt, then stops the target process.
Disable compromised usersoftwareDeploy-linux-target-disable-userubuntuSets the target user's shell to nologin, or locks the account.
Block threat IPtoolDownload-linux-host-block-ipubuntuBlocks the attacker's address inbound (iptables).
Block threat IPtoolDownload-macos-host-block-ipmacosAdds an inbound TCP block rule to /etc/pf.utmstack.conf and loads that file in pf.
Block threat IPtoolDownload-windows-host-block-ipwindowsAdds an inbound block rule for the attacker's address.
Reset account passworduserExec-linux-host-reset-passwordubuntuSets a new password for the target user with passwd --stdin, or forces a password change at next sign-in.
Reset account passworduserExec-macos-host-reset-passwordmacosRuns dscacheutil -q user for the target user. This looks the user up; it does not change the password.
Reset account passworduserExec-windows-host-reset-passwordwindowsRuns net user for the target user with the * password option.

Former UTMStack v11 playbooks

These 8 flows come from UTMStack v11 playbooks whose correlation rule does not ship with UTMStack v12, so their trigger was replaced with the placeholder.

Flow name (as shown)FilePlatformWhat it runs
Windows: A user account was added to administration groupsaccountChange-windows-target-disable-userwindowsDisables the target user, then the adversary user.
Linux - Process Injection Techniques DetectionprocessInjection-linux-target-disable-userubuntuExpires the target user's account; sets the adversary user's shell to nologin.
Linux - CentOS/RHEL - CVE Vulnerability Detection in RHEL SystemwebAttack-linux-host-shutdowncentosShuts the machine down (two attempts).
Windows Defender Exclusions Added via PowerShellwindows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershellwindowsReads the event's log message and removes the process or path exclusion it names.
Windows Defender: Protection Disabledwindows-defender-protection-disabledwindowsRuns MpCmdRun.exe -Enable, then turns Defender real-time monitoring back on.
Windows: Disable Windows Firewall Rules via Netshwindows-disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netshwindowsTurns the firewall on for all profiles, then enables all firewall rules.
Windows: Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShellwindows-disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershellwindowsStep 1 sets several Defender settings (real-time and behaviour monitoring, PUA protection, MAPS reporting, cloud protection) to on when the log message mentions them and to off when it does not. Step 2 turns back on the settings the log message names.
Windows: Remote Desktop Enabled in Windows Firewall by Netshwindows-remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netshwindowsTurns Remote Desktop off and removes the firewall rule named in the event's log message.

Former UTMStack v11 action templates

UTMStack v11 had a catalogue of 73 action templates. In UTMStack v12 those that were kept became these 43 single-step flows, so you can copy a whole flow instead of picking a command. Their trigger is a placeholder, and their Platform is only a hint for whoever completes them: it does not stop the command from running on another kind of machine.

Flow name (as shown)FilePlatformWhat it runs
Windows: Shutdown OS forceddataDestruction-windows-host-shutdownwindowsShuts the machine down at once (shutdown /s /f /t 0).
Enable Windows DefenderdefenseEvasion-windows-host-restore-avwindowsTurns Defender real-time monitoring back on.
Disable RDP and remove rule in FWdisable-rdp-and-remove-rule-in-fwwindowsTurns Remote Desktop off and removes the firewall rule named in the log message.
Windows: Disable RPDlateral-windows-host-disable-rdpwindowsTurns Remote Desktop off.
Linux: Disable target.userlinux-disable-target-userlinuxSets the target user's shell to nologin.
Linux: Isolate hostlinux-isolate-hostlinuxBrings every network interface except loopback down.
Macos: Disable adversary.usermacos-disable-adversary-usermacosSets the adversary user's shell to /usr/bin/false.
Macos: Disable target.usermacos-disable-target-usermacosSets the target user's shell to /usr/bin/false.
Macos: Isolate hostmacos-isolate-hostmacosTurns every network service off.
Kill suspicious keylogging process by namemalware-windows-host-kill-process-namewindowsKills the process named in the event.
Kill suspicious keylogging process by PIDmalware-windows-host-kill-process-pidwindowsKills the process ID given in the event.
Linux: Block server outbound network accessoutbound-linux-host-block-iplinuxBlocks outbound traffic to the attacker's address (iptables).
Macos: Block server outbound network accessoutbound-macos-host-block-ipmacosLoads one pf rule that blocks outbound traffic to the attacker's address. pfctl -f - replaces the rules pf has loaded.
Windows: Block server outbound network accessoutbound-windows-host-block-ipwindowsAdds an outbound block rule for the attacker's address.
Linux: Remove all permissions for a userprivEsc-linux-adversary-remove-permissionslinuxRemoves the adversary user from all its secondary groups.
Macos: Remove all permissions for a userprivEsc-macos-adversary-remove-permissionsmacosRemoves the adversary user from its groups, except staff and everyone.
Windows: Remove all permissions for a userprivEsc-windows-adversary-remove-permissionswindowsRemoves the adversary user from every local group except Users.
Remove exclusions via added powershellremove-exclusions-via-added-powershellwindowsRemoves the Defender process or path exclusion named in the log message.
Remove folder and process exclusion added via powershellremove-folder-and-process-exclusion-added-via-powershellwindowsRemoves the Defender process or path exclusion named in the log message.
Remove Folder Exclusionremove-folder-exclusionwindowsRemoves the Defender path exclusion named in the log message.
Remove Process Exclusionremove-process-exclusionwindowsRemoves a Defender process exclusion. The command contains the fixed example name evil.exe; edit it in your copy.
Restore Behavior Monitoringrestore-behavior-monitoringwindowsTurns Defender behaviour monitoring on when the log message mentions -DisableBehaviorMonitoring, and off otherwise.
Restore Cloud-based Protectionrestore-cloud-based-protectionwindowsSets Defender cloud protection to 1 when the log message mentions CloudProtection, and to 0 otherwise.
Restore MAPS Reportingrestore-maps-reportingwindowsSets Defender MAPS reporting to 1 when the log message mentions -MAPSReporting, and to 0 otherwise.
Restore PUA Protectionrestore-pua-protectionwindowsSets Defender PUA protection to Enabled when the log message mentions -PUAProtection, and to Disabled otherwise.
Restore Real-time Monitoringrestore-real-time-monitoringwindowsTurns Defender real-time monitoring on when the log message mentions -DisableRealtimeMonitoring, and off otherwise.
Linux OpenSUSE: Block server inbound network accessscan-linux-adversary-block-ip-inbound-opensuserhelAdds a firewalld rule that drops the attacker's address, then reloads firewalld.
Linux RHEL: Block server inbound network accessscan-linux-adversary-block-ip-inbound-rhelrhelAdds a firewalld rule that drops the attacker's address, then reloads firewalld.
Linux Debian: Block server inbound network accessscan-linux-adversary-block-ip-inboundubuntuAppends an iptables INPUT rule that drops the attacker's address.
Linux OpenSUSE: Block Adversary IPscan-linux-adversary-block-ip-opensuserhelAdds a firewalld rule that drops the attacker's address, then reloads firewalld.
Linux RHEL: Block Adversary IPscan-linux-adversary-block-ip-rhelrhelAdds a firewalld rule that drops the attacker's address, then reloads firewalld.
Linux Debian: Block Adversary IPscan-linux-adversary-block-ipubuntuAppends an iptables INPUT rule that drops the attacker's address.
Macos: Block server inbound network accessscan-macos-adversary-block-ipmacosLoads one pf rule that blocks inbound traffic from the attacker's address. pfctl -f - replaces the rules pf has loaded.
Windows: Block server inbound network accessscan-windows-adversary-block-ip-inboundwindowsAdds an inbound block rule for the attacker's address.
Windows: Block Adversary IPscan-windows-adversary-block-ipwindowsAdds an inbound block rule for the attacker's address.
Disable Compromised User Accounttravel-linux-target-disable-userlinuxExpires the target user's account.
Windows Defender: Auto Reenable Protectionswindows-defender-auto-reenable-protectionswindowsTurns back on the Defender settings named in the log message.
Windows Defender: Enable Windows Defender protectionwindows-defender-enable-windows-defender-protectionwindowsTurns Defender real-time monitoring back on.
Windows: Disable adversary.userwindows-disable-adversary-userwindowsDisables the adversary user account.
Windows: Disable RDP and disable FW rulewindows-disable-rdp-and-disable-fw-rulewindowsTurns Remote Desktop off and removes the firewall rule named in the log message.
Windows: Disable target.userwindows-disable-target-userwindowsDisables the target user account.
Windows: Enable firewall rules previously disabledwindows-enable-firewall-rules-previously-disabledwindowsEnables all Windows Firewall rules.
Windows: Isolate hostwindows-isolate-hostwindowsDisables every network adapter. The machine loses its connection to UTMStack.

Ready-made commands in the editor

Besides the shipped flows, the editor palette has nine ready-made shell steps for each platform (isolate, shut down, kill a process, log a user out, disable a user, block an address, restart, uninstall a package, remove a file). See Building a Flow.

Changed from UTMStack v11

  • The 23 playbooks and 73 action templates are replaced by these 94 flows.

  • Placeholders were rewritten to start with alert., for example $(alert.adversary.ip).

  • Several former playbooks no longer have a trigger: Windows Defender Exclusions Added via PowerShell, Windows Defender: Protection Disabled, Windows: Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShell, Windows: Disable Windows Firewall Rules via Netsh, Windows: Remote Desktop Enabled in Windows Firewall by Netsh, Windows: A user account was added to administration groups, Linux - Process Injection Techniques Detection, and Linux - CentOS/RHEL - CVE Vulnerability Detection in RHEL System.

  • Flows Page

  • Building a Flow

  • Placeholders

  • Use Cases